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In the first part of this paper, I will present and explain the Singapore Personal Data Pro-
tection Act (“PDPA”) in the context of legislative developments in the Asian region and
against the well-established international baseline privacy standards. In the course of the
above evaluation, reference will be made to the national laws and policy on data privacy
prior to the enactment of the PDPA as well as current social and market practices in
relation to personal data. In the second part of this paper, I will decipher and assess the
future trends in data privacy reform and the future development of the privacy regime in
Singapore and beyond. In the course of this analysis, international standards, technological
trends and recent legal developments in other jurisdictions will be considered.
ª 2013 Warren B. Chik. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Singapore government earnestly began its study on
suitable general personal data protection legislation for
Singapore at the turn of the millennium. Even before that,
the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of
Law had published a working paper on “Data Protection in
Singapore: A Case for Legislation” in 1990. Indications that
the study and research into a suitable national data protec-
tion regime were almost completed came from various
government officers including the Minister for Information,
Communications and the Arts (“MICA”), which was the
government department tasked with the matter, in early
2010. MICA subsequently issued three consultation papers
between September 2011 to April 2012. The first consultation
paper was on the framework of a proposed “Consumer Data
Protection Regime” in Singapore.1 This was followed by a
more specific consultation paper on the feasibility of a “Do
Not Call Registry” to be incorporated into the regime.2 The
third and final consultation paper,3 which took into consid-
eration the comments and feedback received on the first two
public consultation papers, included a draft “Personal Data
5 This study was funded through a research grant (OR REF. NO. 12-C234-SMU-001)(FUND NO. C234/MSS11L008) from the Office of
Research, Singapore Management University. A preliminary version of the paper covering the Singapore Personal Data Protection Bill
was presented at the 7th International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT law (LSPI) that was held in Athens, Greece
from 2 to 4 October 2012.
1 On 13 September 2011, MICA released a Proposed Consumer Data Protection Regime for Singapore and began soliciting feedback
through the public consultation process, which ended on 25 October 2011. The DP Public Consultation document (“CP 1”) is available at:
http://app.mica.gov.sg/Default.aspx?tabid¼481.
2 On 31 October 2011, MICA sought feedback on a proposed National Do Not Call Registry for Singapore, which ended on 5 December
2011. The DNC Registry Consultation document (“CP 2”) is available at: http://app.mica.gov.sg/Default.aspx?tabid¼483.
3 MICA reportedly received 256 responses from organisations, mainly commercial and business entities as well as individuals or
consumers representing the general public. This reflects the two main societal interests in the coverage of the regime. The responses
also showed a divide in the interests of both segments.
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Protection Act” (“PDPA”) with sufficiently detailed provisions
and that also contained MICA’s explanations on the mean-
ing of those provisions.4
It has taken many years for such a law to materialise,5 but
Singapore finally saw its first general personal data protection
law in Parliament in October 2012, which became law in
January 2013 but will only take effect in the middle of 2014.6
This is due to the 18 months sunrise period for most of its
substantive provisions to take effect.7
In the meantime, significant developments have also
occurred in other major jurisdictions. For example, on 25
January 2012, the European Commission proposed a major
and comprehensive overhaul of the European Union’s legal
framework on the protection of personal data to further
strengthen individual rights, especially in the face of chal-
lenges to those rights from globalisation and new technol-
ogies. A major change in its reform is the proposal to turn
the data protection regime from a Directive to a Regulation,
which will strengthen implementation and greater ensure
harmonisation and consistency. Meanwhile, the United
States is increasingly faced with the tensions of rapid
development of online business and social networking
models and has been addressing these at various levels of
its administration.
Thus, it is an opportune time to examine both the PDPA
and how it stands up to scrutiny against the established and
globally recognised baseline privacy standards as well as the
future development and expansion of personal data protec-
tion in the light of the challenges posed by information and
communications technology. In this paper, I will first briefly
present the international and regional personal data protec-
tion and privacy movement and the challenges posed by the
digital era to personal data privacy, which will form the
backdrop to the subsequent analyses in this paper. Second,
themain substantive proposals to the national data protection
regime in Singapore will be examined, with cross-references
made to the provisions of the PDPA. In the process, I shall
examine the significant provisions against their specific pur-
pose and the general objectives of the law. Third, drawing
ideas from the latest developments in data protection laws
and practices, further proposals will be made to enhance the
scope of personal data privacy protection in the longer term,
both for Singapore and other countries that are at a similar
level of development in its data privacy laws and policy.8 In
the process, comparative analysis of recent developments and
trends in other jurisdictions, in particular the European Union
(“EU”) and the United States (“US”) will be made where it is
useful and relevant.
1.1. The digital era and the greater need for personal
data protection laws
The digital era poses increasingly greater challenges to
the integrity of personal informational privacy for many rea-
sons. This is especially so in relation to private sector
developments.9
First, consumer information is “currency”.10 This is espe-
cially so for contact information and consumer profiles. An
example of the former involves the collection and trading of
marketing lists, containing contact data such as telephone
numbers and electronic mail addresses, among businesses
using electronic marketing tools to reach a greater group of
potential clients. On the latter, the tracking of individual
movement between websites constitutes valuable informa-
tion and insight into personal behavioural patterns that
can serve as a more effective alternative to other methods
(such as customer surveys) and better improve advertisement
targeting.
Second, the nature of digitised information contributes to an
environment that does not respect personal data privacy.
Personal data is much easier to collect and disseminate, and
greater Internet user ignorance and carelessness in the online
environment in revealing their personal ‘footprints’ and
sharing personal information as well as the lack of knowledge
and sophistication among such users to reduce or prevent
data mining all add to the problem. Thus more needs to be
done to educate users of their rights, andmore effort is needed
to compel greater transparency and disclosure by data col-
lectors and data users as well as in the extent of the sharing
personal information.
Third, the emphasis on protecting personal privacy relating to
personal data is significant as well as opposed to privacy rights
in general.11 This recognises the need to protect personal
4 On 19 March 2012, MICA finally released a proposed Personal
Data Protection Act (“PDPA”) with detailed and specific provisions
including a summary of responses from its previous public
consultation exercises and an explanation of its position in
relation to the scope and provisions contained in the draft law.
The proposed PDPA and Consultation paper (“CP 3”) is available
at: http://app.mica.gov.sg/Default.aspx?tabid¼487. See also
MICA’s Press Release seeking feedback, available at: http://app.
mica.gov.sg/Default.aspx?
tabid¼79&ctl¼Details&mid¼540&ItemID¼1384.
5 For an analysis of the state of the law prior to this, see Warren
Chik, The Lion, the Dragon and the Wardrobe Guarding the Doorway to
Information and Communications Privacy on the Internet: A Compara-
tive Case Study of Hong Kong and Singapore e Two Differing Asian
Approaches, 14 IJITL 47 (2005).
6 The Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Act 26 of 2012) became
law on 2 January 2013.
7 Under the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (Commence-
ment) Notification 2012, only “Parts I, II, VIII, IX (except sections
36 to 38, 41 and 43 to 48) and X (except section 67(1)), and the First,
Seventh and Ninth Schedules” are in effect at the date the Act
became law.
8 Taking into account the need for a fair balance of rights and
interests of all the stakeholders and larger public interest objec-
tives. These suggestions are for further studies and are not
necessarily required or even suitable for inclusion into the PDP
framework at this stage.
9 The focus of personal privacy and data protection laws in this
paper is in relation to the private sector as the Singapore PDPA
does not apply to the public sector. In contrast, the data protec-
tion law in some countries applies to both the public and private
sector.
10 World Economic Forum, Personal Data: The Emergence of a New
Asset Class (World Economic Forum, 2011), available at: http://
www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_
Report_2011.pdf.
11 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960),
available at: ww.californialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/misc/
prosser_privacy.pdf.
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information to be used as a tool for unreasonable intrusion or
publicity aswell as personal information as a type of ‘property’
of value belonging to the individual (inmost cases) that should
not be used or appropriated without permission.12
Fourth, online businesses models are increasingly reliant on,
and in some cases intricately linked to, the collection, use and
sharing of personal information. The most prominent
example is the rise of social networking platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter. Thus, even tools that primarily help to
improve online services for consumers in the Web 2.0 envi-
ronment have an element of data collection such as the per-
sonalisation of websites (e.g. Yahoo News), streamlining of
data (e.g. Facebook Timeline) and face identification (e.g. facial
recognition technology and face tagging applications) that can
give rise to privacy concerns.
Another example is the practices of companies that pro-
vide online advertisement services, online mapping geo-
location tools and electronic tracking devices. With regard to
the latter, Google Inc. have ‘grabbed’ personal information off
Wi-Fi routers through its data collection cars used for its
Street View project that went beyond the purpose of the
project (i.e. violating the purpose limitation principle). At the
same time Google also inevitably captured certain images that
could constitute an incursion into private space. Online
mapping and geo-location tools tracing the whereabouts of a
person at any point in time through an application in amobile
equipment (e.g. Foursquare, Gowalla and Brightkite)13 can
also be said to involve personal information, the installation
and operation of which will also have to comply with the data
protection principles as it involves ‘locational privacy’.14,15
Hence, many recent prominent disputes in relation to the
mishandling of personal data, and allegations, investigations
and findings of violations of data protection laws, involve
online business entities. Privacy organisations such as the
Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) are increasingly
dealing with online privacy issues compared to other privacy
matters.16 Some of the latest disputes will be elaborated on
later in this paper in relation to some privacy proposals.17
Fifth, user-generated content, citizen journalism and, in
particular, cyber-vigilantism is becoming an Internet phenom-
enon, leading to a higher volume of reportage, visibility and
identification of ordinary people and their behaviour and ac-
tivities in various formats (and increasing in the audio-visual
category) across differentmedia outlets. These also contribute
to a greater violation of personal space and privacy that
consequentially will require stronger protection.18
Sixth, data portability such as the increasing use of cloud
computing for the remote third party storage of personal in-
formation, is posing an increasing concern to security and
control of personal information. A stable and conducive
environment for data management industries, especially at
the outset and at all stages of data processing, can only benefit
all parties concerned. The increasing interest in “privacy by
design” relates to these concerns.
1.2. Advancements in data protection laws in Asia
Since the first international instrument on data protection
appeared in the early 1980s,19 early comprehensive personal
data protection laws have largely been instituted in the Eu-
ropean nations and other jurisdictions in the following years.
The earlier adopters in Asia are the countries (and regions)
that have a stronger history of civil rights and the promotion
and protection of individual freedoms (which includes pri-
vacy rights);20 notably the Privacy Ordinance in Hong Kong
12 Ibid. at 389. Prosser described the four torts of privacy as
“distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests”, which in-
cludes “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or
into his private affairs. 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing pri-
vate facts about the plaintiff. 3. Publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 4. Appropriation, for the
defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.”
13 FourSquare offers rewards for checking-in with local mer-
chants on a mobile phone, and Gowalla and BrightKite provide
personalised tips and suggestions on things to do in the sur-
rounding area.
14 Because these location-based social networking websites or
applications for mobile devices require active user check-ins, the
concern is related more to the consequences of such actions and
user education. For example, users may not be aware that locator
tools also indicate where they are not present at the same time,
which can be useful information for robbers (see: http://
pleaserobme.com/) and stalkers; and that a combination of
tools such as connecting or pushing Foursquare check-ins to
Twitter or Facebook can allow a third party to check-in on behalf
of the user without specific permission first being sought.
15 Meanwhile, the non-commercial governmental use of locator
tools such as the installation and use of GPS tracking devices in
police on vehicles to track suspects (‘passive tracking’) or to keep
track of offenders on probation are some of the activities that will
have to be carefully exempted from the general requirements of
user consent and control.
16 See the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (“EPIC”) website
at: http://epic.org/.
17 At this stage, it suffices to note that the increasing importance
of social networking sites and other platforms that make infor-
mation sharing key to their business model has significant re-
percussions to privacy rights. These entities also have the power
to mould user behavior and influence their attitude towards pri-
vacy, which leads to the dilemma as to how much data sharing is
really a problem over time, especially for a generation that may
consider some practices a norm that can be expected, or even
accepted. To what extent does privacy protection become pater-
nalistic in nature rather than reflect the genuine need for pro-
tection? What role can rules or guidelines on “privacy by default”
play on setting the minimal threshold for user notice, and in turn
user consent and control? These are important considerations
when defining the parameters of any balanced data protection
framework.
18 E.g. the STOMP website in Singapore is a citizen journalism
website, hosting content generated by user-contributors. It is set
up by the Singapore Press Holdings, which is the main media
organisation in Singapore. See the STOMP website at: http://
www.stomp.com.sg/.
19 See the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, available at: http://www.
oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34223_1815186_1_1_1_
1,00.html and http://oecdprivacy.org/.
20 In 2005, the Asia-Pacific regional grouping did produce the APEC
Privacy Framework, available at: http://www.ema.gov.au/www/
agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(03995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2645824B)w
APECþPrivacyþFramework.pdf/$file/APECþPrivacyþFramework.
pdf and http://www.apec.org/. However, the success of the
framework can only be measured by the adoption of PDP laws at
the national level.
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that came into force on 20 December 1996.21,22 Japan also has
a Personal Information Protection Act which was promul-
gated on 23 May 2003 and that entered into effect on 1 April
2005. It applies to the private sector entities that collect,
handle or use personal information.23 Japan has since
updated its privacy law in the following years. There has not
been much advancement in privacy laws in the Asian region
in the years between those events. The lull in the develop-
ment of comprehensive privacy laws in the region ended
only recently, when the drafting of such laws began to gain
momentum in Asian countries, perhaps driven by the
increasing need for data protection for the abovementioned
reasons.
On 27 April 2010, the Taiwanese Legislative Yuan passed an
amendment to the Computer-Processed Personal Data Pro-
tection Act of 1995. The new Personal Information Protection
Act expands the scope of the old Act to cover the collection
and management of personal data by individuals, legal en-
tities and enterprises, not just government agencies and
designated industries as it was previously. The new law will
also provide comprehensive protection to personal data
generally, not just specific sectors, and in any form, not only
computerized data.24
In March 2011, the South Korean government also adopted
its own general Personal Information Protection Act.25 Simi-
larly, the law prescribes the fundamental data protection
principles for the protection of personal data and applies to all
individuals and organisations that process personal data. It is
of interest to note that the Korean legislation contains some
innovations including the requirement for “privacy impact
assessment” in the case of “probable” and “highly probably”
violations by the public and private sectors respectively, a
process for the notification of leaked information and data
breaches and the establishment of a Personal Information
Dispute Mediation Committee to deal with disputes over
personal information.
Malaysia has taken the lead among the ASEAN nations in
Southeast Asia, by passing its version of the Personal Data
Protection Act on 6 May 2010,26 which was due to became law
on 1 January 2013.27 The Malaysian Act makes a distinction
between “personal data” and “sensitive personal data” such as
medical history, religious beliefs, political opinions and the
commission or alleged commission of any offence, the pro-
cessing of which requires explicit consent. In the Philippines,
the Senate had approved a Data Privacy Act in 2011.28
Singapore has been slower out of the gate but is the fastest
to actually have its PDPA enacted.29
Meanwhile, personal data privacy issues are of increasing
concern in the US in relation to high profile disputes
involving the prominent online businesses such as Facebook
and Google, leading to several significant documents issued
on the matter by the White House and the Federal Trade
Commission early in 2012. In the European Union (“EU”), the
European Commission has proposed an EU Data Protection
Regulation 2012 to achieve greater harmonisation, and thus
strengthen even further, the data protection framework in
that region.30
21 See the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data,
Hong Kong website at: http://www.pcpd.org.hk/engindex.html.
See also Warren B. Chik, The Lion, the Dragon and the Wardrobe
Guarding the Doorway to Information and Communications Privacy on
the Internet: A Comparative Case Study of Hong Kong and Singapore e
Two Differing Asian Approaches, International Journal of Law and
Information Technology, 2005 Vol. 14 No. 1, p. 47.
22 Its neighbour, Macau, also has a Personal Data Protection Act
since 2005, available at: http://www.gpdp.gov.mo/en/ and http://
www.gpdp.gov.mo/cht/forms/lei-8-2005_en.pdf. The regime is
regulated by a specially designated “Office for Personal Data
Protection”.
23 Law No. 57 of 2003, available at: http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/information/data/IT-policy/privacy.htm and http://www.
cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/APPI.pdf. According to Article 1,
the objective of the legislation was to “protect the rights and in-
terests of individuals while taking consideration of the usefulness
of personal information, in view of a remarkable increase in the
use of personal information due to development of the advanced
information and communications society.” See also Akihito
Katayama, Personal Information Protection Law: Japan (Freshfields
Bruckaus Deringer, 2005), available at: http://www.freshfields.
com/publications/pdfs/places/11704.pdf; and Michiru Takahashi,
Personal Information Protection Law in Japan (Jones Day, November
2005), available at: http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/
publicationdetail.aspx?publication¼2920.
24 However, the Act has yet to enter into force. It has been re-
ported that this is due to disagreements over some of its pro-
visions. See Anon., Controversial PPA articles to be amended (The
China Post, 13 April 2012), available at: http://www.chinapost.
com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2012/04/13/337702/
Controversial-PIPA.htm.
25 Available at: http://koreanlii.or.kr/w/images/9/98/DPAct1110en.
pdf (unofficial English translation). See also Kwang Hyun Ryoo,
Comprehensive Personal Data Protection Law Enacted (Bae, Kim & Lee
LLC, Spring 2011), available at: http://www.bkl.co.kr/upload/data/
20110423/sub-TELE.html.
26 See Noriswadi Ismail, Selected Issues Regarding The Malaysian
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) 2010, 2(2) International Data
Privacy Law, Vol. 2 Iss. 2 pp. 105-112 (2012).
27 But reportedly still not in force due to legal formalities. See
Liau Yun Qing,Malaysia’s Data Privacy Act Slow To Take Off (ZD Net,
5 February 2013), available at: http://www.zdnet.com/my/
malaysias-data-privacy-act-slow-to-take-off-7000010827/.
28 See Graham Greenleaf, ASEAN’s ‘New’ Data Privacy Laws:
Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, Privacy Laws & Business
International Report, Iss. 116 pp. 22-24, (20 April 2012).
29 Other Asian countries are at early stages of producing per-
sonal data protection instruments. For example, China has draf-
ted a new set of guidelines on “Personal Data Protection
Guidelines for Public and Commercial Service Information Sys-
tems” in April 2012. India have also gone through a checkered
history with some attempts at introducing a comprehensive data
protection law such as in 2006, with indications that another
attempt will be made to introduce such an Act in its Parliament in
2011. See Raghunath Ananthapur, India’s new Data Protection
Legislation, (2011) 8:2 SCRIPTed 192, available at: http://www.law.
ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol8-2/ananthapur.asp and Raghunath
Ananthapur, India’s New Data Protection Legislation: Do The Gov-
ernment’s Clarifications Suffice?, (2011) 8:3 SCRIPTed 317, available at:
http://script-ed.org/?p¼109. Similarly in ASEAN, Thailand also
produced a Data Protection Act sometime in 2008 but have yet to
enact such an Act into law.
30 Peter Blume, Will It Be a Better World? The Proposed EU Data
Protection Regulation, International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 2 Iss. 2
pp. 68-92 (2012).
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2. Main features of the Singapore Personal
Data Protection Act (“PDPA”): an evaluation of
the PDPA provisions, its objectives and effects
The objective of the PDPA is to put in place baseline standards
to “curb excessive and unnecessary collection of an in-
dividual’s personal data by businesses, and would include
requirements such as obtaining the consent of individuals to
disclose their personal information”31. Currently the data
protection regime in Singapore is a mix of sectoral laws con-
tained in specific statutory provisions, mainly to protect sen-
sitive personal information such as trade, professional,
financial or health related information and government
data,32 and disparate data protection codes voluntarily put in
place by private organisations.33 There is no common law
protection for personal privacy in Singapore such as a tort of
privacy,34 which allows individuals the legal recourse against
anyone in relation to the handling of personal information
without his or her consent.35
The data protection regime established by the PDPA is
envisioned as a ’light touch’ baseline regime, which will uni-
formly apply a minimum data protection standard across all
private organisations and industries. MICA has highlighted that
sector-specific laws, which are likely to contain stronger, more
detailed and stringent protections, will continue in their effect
and co-existwith the general data protection legislation. In fact,
they will prevail over the PDPA in the event of a conflict.36
The comprehensive effect of the PDPA is a direct response to
the increasingly invasive nature of aggressive marketing prac-
tices. This was acknowledged as much in the consultation pa-
pers.37 However, as the legislation is meant to be general and
not trade specific, the focus is on the collection and handling of
data, including the use and sharing of such information.38
This part of the paper will provide an overview of the pro-
visions of the PDPA, focusing on the scope of the Act, the
general data protection provisions, and the functions of the “Do
Not Call Registry” and the Personal Data Protection Commis-
sion. The adequacy of the measures will be briefly considered
(with potential issues highlighted and some suggestionsmade),
taking into account the balance of private interests and the
objectives of the data protection regime as a whole.
2.1. Scope of coverage relating to the protection of
personal data
The protections under the law apply only to “personal data”.39 It
also only applies to private sector organisations (not just com-
mercial entities, although it will primarily affect businesses and
individuals engaging in certain trades such as estate and insur-
anceagents).40 Itdoesnotapplytothepublicsector,41 individuals
acting in a personal or domestic (i.e. non-commercial) capacity
or as an employee (in which case the obligation will lie with the
employer instead) and specifically exempted organisations.42
2.1.1. Personal data
The definition of personal data includes true or false data
about an individual that, singularly or collectively, can also
identify that individual. The definition is largely consistent with
international norms and also with the existing Model Data
31 See Shamma Iqbal, Singapore to Introduce Data Protection Law
(Inside Privacy, 13 May 2011), available at: http://www.
insideprivacy.com/international/singapore-to-introduce-data-
protection-law/.
32 See e.g. the Banking Act (Cap 19), Official Secrets Act (Cap 213)
and the Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection
of Secrecy) Act (Cap 319). Also, some forms of professional com-
munications and records are protected by privacy laws for public
interest reasons such as those made in relation to solicitor-client
and doctor-patient relationships.
33 These may or may not be based on the National Internet
Advisory Committee’s Generic “Model Data Protection Code for the
Private Sector” released a full decade ago in 2002 by the IDA and
the National Trust Council, which was modelled after interna-
tionally recognised standards, available at: http://www.agc.gov.sg/
publications/docs/Model_Data_Protection_Code_Feb_2002.pdf.
34 Under the law of confidential information, a plaintiff has to
prove that the information posses the necessary quality of con-
fidence, that there exists an obligation of confidence between the
disputing parties (i.e. the parties share a pre-existing relationship
leading to a duty of confidentiality), and that an unauthorised use
of the information is detrimental to him or her.
35 See The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) x 652A-652I.
36 See section 4(6) & (7). In fact, in the event of a conflict, the
more specific law for information protection, which is likely to be
more stringent, will prevail.
37 In CP 3, para. 1.2 states that: “The proposed DP regime seeks to
safeguard individuals’ personal data against misuse, at a time
when such data has become increasingly valuable for businesses
and more easily collected and processed with infocomm tech-
nology.” (emphasis mine).
38 See section 3, which states that: “The purpose of this Act is to
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal data by or-
ganisations in a manner that recognises both the right of in-
dividuals to protect their personal data and the need of
organisations to collect, use or disclose personal data for pur-
poses that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the
circumstances.” The objective “reasonable person test” as applied
to subjective “circumstances” will have to be elucidated by
guidelines issued by the Personal Data Protection Commission
and in future court decisions. The pervasiveness of the “reason-
ableness test” throughout the Act will provide flexibility but at the
same time give rise to uncertainty as to the parameters of what
would constitute legitimate activities in relation to the re-
quirements of the PDPA.
39 See section 2 for the definition of “personal data”, which
“means data, whether true or not, about an individual who can be
identified - (a) from that data; or (b) from that data and other
information to which the organisation is likely to have access”.
40 See section 2 for the definition of “organisation”, which “in-
cludes any individual, company, association or body of persons,
corporate or unincorporated”.
41 The government often refers to existing laws and regulations
governing the protection of data by the public sector. See e.g. the
Official Secrets Act (Cap 213) and the Statutory Bodies and Gov-
ernment Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act (Cap 319). How-
ever, these laws do not relate directly or specifically to “personal
data”. Moreover, government practices relating to information
that is contained in the government “Instruction Manual” are not
transparent and may not fulfil all the requirements under the
PDPA that applies to the private sector.
42 See section 4(1). A more limited regime of protection extends
to the personal data of the deceased. See section 4(3)(b).
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Protection Code of 2002 (“MPDPC”).43 However, what actually
constitutes “personal data” will have to be further elucidated
by the Personal Data Protection Commission and the courts in
the future. The Personal Data Protection Commission is
currently looking into this issue in its Proposed Advisory
Guidelines on Key Concepts in the PDPA.
Unlike Malaysia’s data protection regime, “sensitive data”
is left to sector-specific laws and provisions, some of which
already precedes the PDP regime. This is consistent with
keeping the PDPA as a “content-neutral” and harmonised
baseline regime. The coverage of data irrespective of its me-
dium and format of collection and management is also
consistent with the “technology-neutral” and “principle-
based” philosophy and will make compliance easier.
The time limitation and limited post-life extension of
protection are also uncontroversial given the practicality of
these parameters to be drawn.44 In fact, there are some
overlaps between general life expectancy and the 100-year
limit criteria. Moreover, the latter accords limited but
reasonable protection, in relation to disclosure and security,
that goes beyond the usual ambit of protection under the in-
ternational regime.45 Perhaps the protection of the personal
data of deceased individuals need not be automatic but can be
activated by familymembers through registration. It will have
to be made clear who are the family members that have the
right and authority to make decisions in relation to the de-
ceased’s data (i.e. the identification and verification of these
representatives)46. The Personal Data Protection Commission
is currently looking into this issue in its Proposed Regulations
under the PDPA.
2.1.2. Exclusions and carve-outs
Exclusions have been included in the PCP Act and the cate-
gories of exclusions can also continue to expand even after the
Act is passed.47 The Schedules contain the specific carve-outs
from compliance with certain principles based on consent for
collection (Second Schedule), use (Third Schedule) and disclo-
sure (Fourth Schedule) aswell as for access (Fifth Schedule) and
correction (Sixth Schedule). The reasonableness of each of
these exclusionswill not be considered here although there are
arguments to bemade that someof themare toowide or vague.
Caution should be exercised by the Minister when considering
whether to expand the list of exclusions, to ensure that the list
of exclusions do not cast a wider shadow over data protection
and its objectives. In that regard, strong reasons and stringent
criteria should be set for any exemptions to be made and the
rationale for existing exclusions that may weaken over time
should likewise be considered for removal.48
Specifically excluded from the data protection regime is
“business contact information”.49 Although there are good ar-
guments for its exclusions, the line between the use of certain
business contact information, especially electronic mail ad-
dresses and to a lesser extent telephone numbers, for personal
and business use is unclear. Some sole proprietors and self-
employed individuals use the same contact information for
personal and business purposes. In these cases where there is
an overlap or concomitant uses, and in the interest of greater
protection, the information should be considered personal data
for thepurposes of theAct unless the person otherwise declares.
2.2. The privacy principles and the protection of personal
data: consent, control and care
The data privacy principles are uncontroversial as they are
based on the international standards first set out by the Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (“OECD”)
and subsequently adopted by many regional and national data
protection laws50 These rules are set out in Part II of the PDPA.
43 See the Report on a Model Data Protection Code for the Private
Sector (NIAC, 2002), available at: http://www.agc.gov.sg/
publications/docs/Model_Data_Protection_Code_Feb_2002.pdf
and http://www.trustsg.org.sg/downloads/Data_Protection_
Code_v1.3.pdf.
44 See section 4(4).
45 But the limitation of protection only to disclosure and security
is quite a low threshold requirement and should be relatively
easy to comply.
46 CP 3 para. 2.29.
47 It is to be noted that the Personal Data Protection Commission,
with the approval of the Minister in charge, has the explicit powers
to make regulations for further specific exclusions/exemptions for
personsororganisations, rather thanbasedonthenatureof thedata
(see section 62). TheMinistermay also amend any of the Schedules
that exempt the requirement to obtain consent (see section 64) as
well as the power tomake regulations pursuant to section 65. In the
responses toCP1, thereweremanysuggestions for other exclusions
from the requirement to obtain an individual’s consent under the
regime. For example, the personal data of prospective student ap-
plicants and in examination scripts and documents.
48 As they diminish the general regime for personal data pro-
tection, the powers to establish and expand the list of exclusions
should be used sparingly and after careful consideration and
further consultation from the relevant stakeholders. Even where
exclusions are made, there should be specific laws and regula-
tions or codes and guidelines on the collection and management
of such data to ensure that there is no misuse of such
information.
49 Based on general support garnered from the CP 1 exercise,
“business contact information” is also generally excluded from the
data protection regime. See section 4(5). “Business contact infor-
mation” is defined under section 2 as referring to “individual’s
name, position name or title, business telephone number, business
address, business electronic mail address or business fax number
and any other similar information about the individual, not provided
by the individual solely for his personal purposes” (emphasis added).
50 See the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Per-
sonal Data (“OECD Privacy Principles”), available at: http://
oecdprivacy.org/. These Principles have been substantively
adopted by regional and national data protection and privacy
laws such as the European Union’s Data Protection Directive
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼CELEX:
31995L0046:en:HTML) and the Hong Kong (Personal Data) Privacy
Ordinance (http://www.pcpd.org.hk/). See also, the Privacy of
Personal Data in Hong Kong website at: http://www.privacy.com.
hk/. 2010 was the 30th Anniversary of the OECD Privacy Guide-
lines. See the Anniversary Statement at: http://www.oecd.org/
document/35/0,3746,en_2649_34255_44488739_1_1_1_1,00.html.
See further, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Privacy Framework
(“APEC Privacy Framework”) of 2005, available at: http://
publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id¼390
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Table 1 provides a general comparison of the principles as they
appear under the OECD Guidelines51 and in the PDPA. It also
relates them to the nature of the protection; that is, the distri-
bution of duties to organisations (i.e. “care”) and the empow-
erment of the individual with regard to his or her data in the
hands of such organisations (i.e. “consent” and “control”).
Most of the provisions, especially that relating to
compliance with universally accepted privacy principles are
straightforward. The PDPA will require “organisations”,
defined under section 2 of the Act as including “any indi-
vidual, company, association or body of persons, corporate
or unincorporated, whether or not formed or recognised
under the law of Singapore; or resident, or having an office
or a place of business, in Singapore”, to obtain individuals’
consent, express or implied, to the collection, use and
disclosure of “personal data”. It limits an organisation’s
collection, use and disclosure of such data only to the
purposes for which the individual concerned has con-
sented. It also require organisations to give individuals ac-
cess to their personal data, ensure that the data is accurate
and take care of the data through the implementation of
reasonable security arrangements (amongst other
responsibilities).52
2.2.1. Collect, use and disclose: the nature of consent
To prevent abuse in the collection, use and disclosure of per-
sonal data, there is a limit on the type of information that can
be obtained, whichmust be confined to the purpose, defined as
that which “a reasonable person would consider appropriate
in the circumstances”. This means that an organisation
cannot request, and an individual cannot consent, to any
collection, use or disclosure of personal information beyond
that which is “reasonable” (objectively ascertained) and
“appropriate” (under the subjective circumstances).53 In order
for actual informed consent,54 the reason cannot be given to
the subject only after collection, use or disclosure and the
subject can seek more information and clarification from a
contact point.55 Similarly, the same limits apply in the case
where the personal information is linked to the supply of
goods or services.56
In general, actual consent should be encouraged whether in
law, in practice or both. From the feedback obtained during
the consultation period, mixed views were obtained from
organisations and individuals as to whether organisations
should be required to obtain explicit consent from in-
dividuals, even if there was already an existing business
relationship, in relation to data that had already been ob-
tained prior to the operation of Part IV. The PDPA contains a
‘grandfathering clause’, which makes it clear that the obli-
gations to obtain consent for purpose does not have pro-
spective application to personal information collected
“before the appointed day” unless the individual actively
withdraws consent (in accordance with section 16) or “opts-
out” of the use of his or her personal data.57 Organisations
noted that such a requirement could impact their existing
practices and increase business costs. Individuals generally
welcomed the proposal to require explicit consent. In my
view, there need not be explicit consent as long as there are
safeguards for actual consent, whether expressed or
implied.58
There are safeguards even in the case of “deemed consent”,
where consent must be freely obtained (i.e. “voluntary” and
not under obtained under duress or by coercion), which can be
objectively determined (“reasonable” and “for [the relevant]
purpose”).59 Because the reason or purpose in this case need
not be furnished before or during collection, use or
Table 1 e Comparative table: OECD Guidelines and PDPA.
Privacy principles under the
OECD guidelines
Personal data protection rules
under the PDPA
Nature and premise of
the protection
Collection limitation Collection Consent
Use limitation Use Consent
Disclosure Consent
Purpose specification Purpose Consent (implied)
Data quality, openness Access and correction retention Control
Data quality, security safeguards Accuracy, protection (and retention) Care
Accountability Penalty and enforcement Care
51 See the OECD Privacy Principles at: http://www.oecd.org/
document/20/0,3746,en_2649_34255_15589524_1_1_1_1,00.html;
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html; http://oecdprivacy.org/. See also the
APEC Privacy Framework at: http://www.apec.org/Groups/
Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/w/media/Files/Groups/
ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx.
52 Parts III - VI.
53 The “reasonableness test” here can be compared to the
“reasonable man” test that is used in the tort law of negligence.
54 Sections 11(1) & 18(a).
55 Section 20(1) (“Notification of purpose”).
56 Section 14(2). Consent must be legitimate, informed and un-
ambiguous. Consent obtained by commercial pressure or decep-
tion do not satisfy this criteria. See section 14(3).
57 Section 19.
58 There can be actual implied consent, for example, where
terms of data collection, use or disclosure are stated out within
notice that is sufficiently given to the subject, even if the subject
chooses to accept the terms without actually reading them.
59 Section 15. Similarly, real or actual consent is emphasized in
relation to the collection, use and disclosure of personal infor-
mation in relation to the provision of goods and services. See
section 14(3) (a form of consumer protection).
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disclosure,60 there may not be actual consent.61 Perhaps the
role this provision can be compared to the use of the “business
efficacy” or “officious bystander” test in contract law that
implies terms into a contract in order to “fill in the gaps” of an
agreement with terms that the parties would have incorpo-
rated if they had put their minds to it. Another possible use of
this provision is to obviate the detailing of all incidental and
consequential handling of personal data that relates to the
general purpose or objective that have been related to the
individual (and to which consent is given) - that means that
the notification of purpose can be general (but not ambig-
uous). The Personal Data Protection Commission is currently
looking into this issue in its Proposed Advisory Guidelines on
Key Concepts in the PDPA. Similar provisions appear in other
foreign statutes, such as the “implicit consent” provision in
the Personal Information Protection Acts of the Canadian
states of British Columbia and Alberta.62 Also, the legitimacy
of the use of “opt-out” mechanisms and “pre-ticked boxes”
was an issue in relation to the EU’s ‘Cookie law’ (e-Privacy
Directive).63
In some jurisdictions, consent is deemed to have been given
when the individual is notified of an organisation’s intention to
collect, use or disclose his or her personal data, and he or she
does not object to that practicewithin a reasonable timeperiod.
In CP 3, MICA appears to allow non-actual consent of this na-
ture.64 This can cover the situation involving consent sought
using “opt-out” mechanisms and “pre-ticked boxes”. Practices
under an “opt-out” regime may be cost effective for organisa-
tions, but they shift the burden to the individual to withdraw
consent at the point of notification or agreement to the indi-
vidual. Table 2 lays out some of the different methods of
soliciting consent that are commonly used by online platforms
in their terms of use/service agreements.
In comparison, the EU is proposing increased responsibility
and accountability for those processing personal data, through
data protection risk (or privacy impact) assessments, data
protection officers, and the implementation of “privacy by
design” and “privacy by default” principles.65 “Data protection
by design” is where privacy and data protection are embedded
throughout the life cycle of technologies (i.e. “design of the
processing”). More relevant to the issue here is “Data protection
by default”, which requires organisations to put in place pri-
vacy settings that constitutes a reliable indicator of consumers’
consent. It would require opting into sharing information (i.e.
affirmative grant of permission to share information by users),
rather than opting out of it (i.e. affirmative steps to protect in-
formation by users). The “privacy by default” rule will promote
fair and reasonable collection and processing of data, and it is
consistent with the provision of sufficient notice and the
granting of real consent.66
Finally, as mentioned previously, there are also carve-outs
for collection, use and disclosure without requiring consent or
adherence to the purpose limitation principle under the Sec-
ond, Third and Fourth Schedules.67 It is to be noted that ex-
ceptions are also made to other statutory or regulatory
requirements.68
Even though the provisions in Part IV revolves around con-
sent and purpose, there is also an element of control which is
worked into the requirement for adequately informed (i.e. timely)
consent and the right to make inquiries and seek clarification
on the purpose. This element of control ismore apparent in the
powers given to the subject to withdraw consent.69
2.2.2. Access, correction and retention: the extent of control
The focus on personal primary ‘ownership’ of data explains
the extension of the protection beyond the stage of collec-
tion, which concerns the act of acquiring the information
(largely with notice and informed consent) and the circum-
stances and reasons for the collection (i.e. the use and
disclosure). The individual has the power to control the
personal information whilst it is temporarily in the care of a
third party. The rules on this are contained under Part V.
These rules are also based on clear privacy principles
60 Section 20(3)(a). “[W]ithout actually giving consent referred to
in section 14” (see Section 15(1)(a)).
61 For the purpose of the collection, use and disclosure in ques-
tion. But see e.g. Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long [1979] UKPC 2 on the im-
plicit “understanding” between the parties in relation to good
consideration under contract law, which is not tied to a chrono-
logical timeline. Can it be argued, at least in some cases and
circumstances such as in this case, that there is real consent even
if it is obtained before the purpose is relayed?
62 See section 8 of the Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C.
2003, c. 63 (British Columbia) [BC Act] and the Personal Information
Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 (Alberta) [Alberta Act]
respectively.
63 Directive 2009/136/EC (‘Cookie law’) amending the Privacy and
Electronic Communications Directive (e-Privacy Directive) 2002/
58[1]/EC Directive 2009/136/EC, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri¼OJ:L:2009:337:0011:0036:En:
PDF. See also Liat Clark, IOC Commissioner Slams EU Data Protection
Directive (Wired.co.uk, 7 February 2013), available at: http://www.
wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-02/07/ico-against-eu-data-
protection.
64 See CP 3 para. 2.48. “An individual could be considered to have
voluntarily provided personal data when it is within his control to
prevent the collection of the personal data, but does not do so.”
The responses to CP 1 provided a divided response to the issue of
whether failure to “opt-out” shall be deemed consent. The divide
is clearly delineated between the proponents, which encom-
passes largely the organisations on the one side; and the oppo-
nents, which consists largely of the individuals that have given
their views on the other.
65 Article 23 of the PDR sets out the obligations of the controller
arising from the principles of data protection by design and by
default.
66 These general rules can be supplemented by detailed guide-
lines from the Personal Data Protection Commission (perhaps
with industry and privacy group engagement) on best practices
(form informed notice and consent). For example, the preferred
mode of notice and consent is through explicit and affirmative
action, such as in the case of click wrap agreements that offer
sufficient access to and notice of terms and the ticking of boxes or
typing of “I Agree”. Pre-ticking of boxes or an “I Agree” button
may also suffice. The Commission can also provide clarification
on what would constitute “opt-in” and “opt-out” in relation to
various practices and mechanisms through the study and cate-
gorisation of current practices, terms/policies and operational
technologies.
67 Sections 17 and 20(3)(b).
68 CP 3 para. 2.43.
69 Section 16.
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relating to the maintenance of data quality and openness.
The response to requests for access to personal data is based
on reasonableness.70 The “reasonableness test” extends to
accession to request and time of acquiescence as well as to
the basis of assessment as to whether a request for correc-
tion should be acceded to.71 It also forms the basis for the
rules on retention of (and access to) personal data after the
reason for use and purpose expire.72
An important issue relating not to the “right” but to the
“ability” to exercise that right lies on the cost of such requests.
With regard to this, MICA has stated that fees could be
chargeable and should be left flexible. This is fair although it
should be emphasized that any cost should not be prohibitory
and should only be to allay administrative costs and not to
generate profits. Perhaps a ceiling on costs should be given to
ensure that it is not prohibitory or misused (e.g. to discourage
genuine and fair requests).
It is a natural extension of the protection, and the powers
and control of the individual over his or her own information,
that redress can be sought where breaches to protection
occur. The role of care and accountability to ensure compli-
ance is the third level of protection that will be considered
next.
2.2.3. Accuracy, security and enforcement: care (and
compliance)
The PCPA takes a two-pronged approach to ensure that care is
taken in relation to themanagement and handling of personal
data: The responsibility prescribed and imposed for proper
management of the data and the consequences of non-
compliance with all the abovementioned privacy protection
measures. These rules are contained in Parts VI and VII
respectively. These cumulatively fulfil the accountability
principle.
With regard to the former, the “reasonableness test” once
again forms the basis for the effort to ensure accurate and
complete data on individuals and for the security arrange-
ments for such data under the organisation’s custody or
control.73
In relation to the latter, effective enforcement is multifac-
eted and can be made through directions given by the Per-
sonal Data Protection Commission,74 resolved through
alternative dispute resolution or in a court of law (e.g. in civil
suits for private action,75 or through criminal prosecution for
offences committed under the Act)76. There are powers to fine
and imprison for offences and penalties under the Act. Orga-
nisations can also be fined up to S$100,000 (and individuals
can be jailed and fined up to S$10,000) if they either obstruct
the PDPC in the performance of its duties or powers, makes a
false statement, misleads or attempts to mislead the Com-
mission in the course of the performance of its the duties or
powers.77
The PDPA adopts a “complaints-based approach” rather
than an “audit-based approach”.78 The PDPA sets up a Per-
sonal Data Protection Commission under Part II of the Act to
enforce the Act (among other things). It will have the powers
to issue orders for an organisation to rectify any non-
compliance. The Commission will also have the powers to
require an organisation to pay a financial penalty of an
amount not exceeding S$1 million,79 notwithstanding any
order already made by it. The current cap of S$1 million is
quite substantial and is arguably adequate sanction with
sufficient deterrent effects for non-compliance with the Act.
The EU acknowledged as much the importance of sufficiently
strong penalties in its proposed reforms for improved
administrative and judicial remedies in cases of violation of
data protection rights in Europe.
Criminal penalties may also be imposed on organisations
or individuals that obstruct the Commission or its authorised
delegate in the performance of its duties or powers under the
Act.80 This is significant as powers of investigation, to conduct
inquiry and review as well as greater penalties for non-
cooperation and obstruction of investigations, are important.
In the US, the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”)
probe into Google Inc. and its Google Street View project
allegedly faced obstruction in investigations leading to an
Table 2 e Expressions of consent: the nature and effect of opt-in and opt-out clauses.
Opt-in regime Opt-out regime
Actual consent Non-actual consent
Affirmative action (express consent) e
ticking and agreeing, whether by
button or manual
typing (in the ‘click wrap’ sense)
Passive omission (implied consent) e
pre-ticked in click wrap sense, not
removing tick
Passive omission (no real consent) e
providing hyperlink to terms on the
website (in the ‘browse wrap’ sense)
Non-action (no real
consent) e no terms
laid out
Actual perusal or reading of terms irrelevant Actual notice of terms irrelevant
70 Section 21(1). This is subject to the statutory exceptions stated
in the Fifth Schedule (section 21(2)) and section 23(3).
71 Section 22 (which is to be done “as soon as practicable”).
Under CP 3 para. 2.98, a suggestion of action within 30 days as a
norm is proposed but not mandatory. This is subject to the
statutory exceptions stated in the Sixth Schedule (section 22(7)).
72 Section 25.
73 Sections 23 and 24.
74 Sections 29 and 30.
75 Section 32.
76 Part X.
77 Section 51.
78 Parts VII and VIII for the enforcement of the rules contained in
Parts III to VI. Organisations are vicariously accountable for the
actions of their agents and employees.
79 Section 29(2)(d).
80 Part X.
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ineffectual fine of a mere US$25,000.81 Sufficiently strong
sanctions are required for effective deterrence in such cases
and the provisions under the PDPA seem to bear this out. This
will reinforce the objectives of the accountability and trans-
parency principles.
Provisions requiring data breach notification can be
considered in the future. Data breach notification requires
organisations to inform individuals and the relevant govern-
ment authority when their personal information with the said
organisation has been compromised due to security
breaches.82 Amongst other things, it provides transparency
and builds trust between the organisation and individuals. It is
also a security measure as it is an essential step to restoring
control over the information concerned aswell as heightening
vigilance so as to prevent further breaches from occurring. In
theUS, Acts on data security and data breach notification have
been introduced.83 Similar reform has also been proposed in
the EU and Australia.84 Notification requirements will fit in
with the transparency principle and effective enforcement.
2.3. Distribution and extent of responsibility: compliance
(role and mechanisms)
2.3.1. Data controllers: compliance (national)
The PDPA makes a distinction between “data controllers”
and “data intermediaries”.85 The regime recognises their
distinctive role and functions on the Internet and places the
appropriate but different responsibilities on both kinds of
organisations. The distinction is one based on control over
third party material, which means that while organisations
in control of personal data have to adhere to all the provisions;
intermediaries that serve only as conduits and that are merely
concerned with the technical processing of data (on the
behalf of third parties) are only required to comply with the
various requirements for the care of such information, spe-
cifically the security and protection of personal data under
section 26 of the PDPA.86 The acts of the data intermediaries
are attributed back to the data controller or organisation that
engaged its services and on whose behalf that act was per-
formed, whichwill remain responsible for the legality of such
activities.87
The recognition of data intermediaries reduces the
compliance costs for such organisations, and support Singa-
pore’s drive to be a technology hub for data processing activ-
ities (e.g. local hosting and cloud providers). The distinction is
consistent with the ‘safe harbour protections’ for “data in-
termediaries” in other legislations that protect Internet in-
termediaries that lack control over data transferred through
their operational services.88 It is to be noted that such an
approach is in line with international norms and EU
standards.89
Section 67(2) of the PDPA amended section 26 of the Elec-
tronic Transactions Act (Cap. 88) by adding a new subsection
(1A) which provides that “[s]ubject to subsection (2), a network
81 See In the Matter of Google Inc., Federal Communications
Commission, DA 12-592, File No.: EB-10-H-4055, 13 April 2012,
available at: http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_
Business/2012/db0416/DA-12-592A1.pdf. In this case, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FTC”) conducted an investiga-
tion into Google’s Wi-Fi data collection for its Street View project
that was alleged by the complainants, EPIC, to have collected
“payload” data not needed for its location database project. The
data included e-mail and text messages, passwords, Internet
usage history and other personal information. However, Google
allegedly blocked the investigations by refusing to divulge infor-
mation in response to investigative inquiry, which led to a fine of
only US$25 000, a negligible sum to the high net worth Google Inc.
82 If data is accidentally or unlawfully destroyed, lost, altered,
accessed by or disclosed to unauthorised persons, the businesses
and organisations concerned will need to inform individuals
about data breaches that could adversely affect them without
undue delay. They will also have to notify the relevant data
protection authority.
83 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 1151, 112th
Congress (2011); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of
2011, S. 1207, 112th Congress (2011); Data Breach Notification Act
of 2011, S.1408, 112th Congress (2011); Data Security Act of 2011,
S.1434, 112th Congress (2011); Personal Data Protection and
Breach Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1535, 112th Congress (2011);
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1707, 112th Congress
(2011); Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2011, H.R. 1841, 112th
Congress (2011); Secure and Fortify Electronic Data Act, H.R. 2577,
112th Congress (2011). For a cross-section of state laws, see the
State Security Breach Notification Laws depository at the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) website at: http://www.
ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/security-breach-notification-
laws.aspx. Although some states provide for civil action
(including class action) lawsuits on top of legislative penalties,
generally the latter is still the more prominent outcome to data
breaches.
84 See Data Breach Notification: A Guide to Handling Personal
Information Security Breaches, Office of the Australian Informa-
tion Commissioner (OAIC) (April 2012), available at: http://www.
oaic.gov.au/publications/guidelines/privacy_guidance/data_
breach_notification_guide_april2012.html. The Guide aim to
encourage voluntary notification measures among private sector
organisations until such time as it becomes law.
85 Section 4(2) and (3).
86 The safeguards set out in the Act include making “reasonable
effort” to ensure personal data is kept accurately (section 25) and
“ reasonable security arrangements to prevent unauthorised ac-
cess, collection, use, disclosure, copying, modification or disposal
or similar risks” (section 26).
87 Section 4(3). The task of obtaining consent from individuals in
the collection of their personal data is the exclusive responsibility
of organisations that are data controllers and not those that
merely process the information for them.
88 E.g. section 26(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act (Cap. 88)
on the liability of “network service providers”, which generally
protects network service providers that “merely provides access”
to third-party material in the form of electronic records from any
civil or criminal liability under any rule of law if the liability is
based on “the making, publication, dissemination or distribution
of such materials or any statement made in such material; or the
infringement of any rights subsisting in or in relation to such
material.” But note the exceptions under subsection (2), which
refers to the treatment of such intermediaries under other spe-
cific legislations.
89 See e.g. the Section 4 of the EU’s Electronic Commerce Direc-
tive (2000/31/EC) on the liability of “intermediary service pro-
viders” and the Communications Decency Act (47 USC x230) and
the Online Copyright Infringement Limitation Liability Act (17
USC x512) in the US. This is also an example of a public policy
consideration determining the allocation of responsibility for
data collection and processing under the PDP law, see below.
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service provider shall not be subject to any liability under the
Personal Data Protection Act 2012 in respect of third-party
material in the form of electronic records to which he
merely provides access.”
However, there may be some issues over what organisa-
tions fall within the definition of a “data intermediary”, which
will have to be sorted out in the future. The Personal Data
Protection Commission is currently looking into this issue in
its Proposed Advisory Guidelines on Key Concepts in the
PDPA.
2.3.2. The Personal Data Protection Commission (“PPDPC”):
compliance (national)
The enforcement of these laws will come under a Personal
Data Protection Commission (“PPDPC”) set up pursuant to the
PDPA. The role of the PPDPC is an important one and is spelt
out in Part II of the PDPA. Its functions, which are compre-
hensive and more than satisfactory, are stated generally in
section 7 of the PDPA.90 In particular, it has an important role
in the following:
a. The Commission can exercise powers to investigate or
conduct inquiry (compliance oversight and in-
vestigations),91 powers of review and to give direction (e.g.
the issuance of rectification orders) and powers of
enforcement (to give force to the accountability principle)
are fleshed out in detail in Part VII of the Act.
b. The Commission can provide guidance and auditing ser-
vices (for organisations),92 the issuance of guidelines and
guidance such as on concepts like “consent”, “reason-
ableness” and “necessity” to the extent possible, given that
these are judgment based assessments based on the cir-
cumstances of each case.93
c. The Commission can conduct personal data and privacy
education and awareness efforts (for organisations as well
as for society at large). For example, training sessions and
guidelines can be customised for different industries,94
and individuals can be presented with multimedia pre-
sentations and advertisements or pamphlets explaining
their rights under the PDP regime.
d. The Commission can deal with issues andmake proposals
to various public institutions (for law reform in their
respective fields) and private organisations (to establish
harmonized codes of conduct and best practices) as and
when they arise.
Examples of similar Commissions, such as the Privacy
Commission in Hong Kong, and their good track record attest
to their importance.95 The Singapore PPDPC has been set up as
a statutory body in January 2013 and already has a dedicated
website online. Already, the PPDPC is hard at work in prom-
ulgating guidelines and regulations. A public consultation
exercise on proposed regulations and advisory guidelines for
key concepts and selected topics has been launched; and it
is expected that more of such regulations and guidelines will
be produced to inform and advise individuals and organisa-
tions as to their rights and obligations under the Act
respectively.
2.3.3. Jurisdiction: compliance (international)
No national data protection laws will fully or adequately
protect personal data against misuse since data flows are
transnational and such laws necessarily have limited extra-
territorial effect (prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction)
and no domestic court of law can exercise adjudicatory
jurisdiction over all overseas-based organisations. However,
the laws can to some extent try to compel compliance by
overseas organisations as well as to encourage greater coop-
eration and enhancement of similar levels of protection by
foreign governments. The EU has done the latter with its
provisions on stemming the free flow of information to
countries that fall below its data protection standards.
Under MICA’s “principle-based approach”, the onus is on
the organisation, considered to have control over the data,
to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to protect
personal data transferred outside Singapore wherever it is
so transferred. This also means that the organisation is
under an obligation to ensure at least equivalent treatment
90 The PPDPC is also advised by an Advisory Committee to be
appointed by the Minister-in-Charge (section 7) and can delegate
its work (section 8). It will also have the support of the regulatory
authorities, the Ministry (MICA) and the courts (in enforcement
situations). An appeal mechanism from the Commission’s de-
cisions is also set up under Part VIII.
91 Even without complaints from consumers. It is clear from
comparing several jurisdictions that a dedicated privacy
watchdog is important to maintain vigilance through random or
scheduled checks. As noted previously, the Singapore PDPA
contains provisions that provide for criminal penalties for orga-
nisations obstructing or misleading the PPDPC, and for failure to
comply with an order issued by the PPDPC. These powers will
strengthen the PDPC’s authority.
92 Audits are discretionary as the Commission is envisaged to
take a ‘complaints-based’ approach. In the opinion of this author,
voluntary audits, impact assessments and other similar mea-
sures, with the guidance of the Commission, can only be a good
thing and should not be discouraged. Random checks can also
put such organisations on their toes and ensure greater
compliance.
93 Regulations, codes of practice and guidelines can be made to
supplement the provisions of Act. Under section 28, the PPDPC is
given explicit powers to publish guidelines interpreting the stat-
utory provisions in various contexts. One method is to provide
guidance on how the PDPA will apply to specific practices or
scenarios. See e.g. CP 3 Annex C.
94 Through the issuance of guidelines, thee PDPC can provide
clarity and react quickly to specific and novel issues to prevent
violations from occurring.
95 See the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data,
Hong Kong website at: http://www.pcpd.org.hk/. The Hong Kong
Privacy Commissioner has issued specific guidelines such as
employer monitoring of employees, which is required after
several high profile cases including the Claire Swire incident and
the practice of demanding private Facebook password and access
from potential employees by certain employers. In contrast, the
US does not have comprehensive data protection laws or a
dedicated overseer of privacy adherence. Data privacy matters
are left to the various government departments to deal with in a
piecemeal manner, and even then only when it comes under
their purview; and in the instance of compliance, investigations
are only initiated upon complaints made such as by civil rights
groups (which is an unsatisfactory way of handling things).
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and protection of the personal data that is transferred
abroad,96 which thus meets the same requirements in
relation to the flow of data as the international obligations
such as those instituted by the EU in their Data Protection
Directive. This is in contrast to the more “prescriptive
approach” that require adequacy rulings for foreign regimes
or the approval of binding corporate rules (or standard
contractual clauses).97
Certainly, this will lessen the burden on the organisation,
but the question is whether this will be practicable and
effective, given the difficulty in overseeing, investigating and
enforcing such measures when the data has flowed out if
jurisdiction; and also, whether there is any incentive for the
‘national treatment’ of our data in other less compliant ju-
risdictions. As noted, the “prescriptive approach” will also
promote a global privacy standard.98
2.4. The Do Not Call (“DNC”) Registry: consent (to
contact)
As noted, one of the biggest impetuses for the PDP law is the
increasingly aggressive use of personal contact information
such as electronic messaging services (e.g. Short Messaging
Services (“SMS”) and Multimedia Messaging Services
(“MMS”)), fax messages and telephone numbers for marketing
purposes. This is where the relationship between personal
data and personal privacy is most apparent.
The lack of laws in these respect (i.e. in relation to tele-
marketing, which is largely left to industry self-regulation on a
voluntary basis) and the failure of existing laws in others (i.e.
the Spam Control Act (Cap. 311A)) of 2007)99 contribute to the
call for more effective regulations and account for the inclu-
sion of the DNC Registry after feedback from the first round of
consultations.100 There have also been calls for tougher
measures to deal with the persistent problem of unwanted e-
mail messages, which are unfortunately not addressed under
the PDPA.
It is important, in order to give effect the consent and
control principles, to provide leeway for individuals to remove
consent generally through a simple procedure, especially in
relation to personal contact details that have already been, at
the time that the Act comes into force, disseminated and
misused to the extent that an “opt-out” regime (i.e. to
unsubscribe) from third party contact becomes impracticable.
Hence, a DNC regime (with a choice to “opt-in” to messages
from specific sources) will form an integral part of the legis-
lation. The DNC regime is contained in Part IX of the PDPA.
2.4.1. Coverage and scope: application of the DNC Registry
and “specified message”
The Registry allows telephone “subscribers” to “opt-out” of
receiving “specified messages” sent to a “Singapore tele-
phone number”, such as those frequently sent by mar-
keters.101 Section 37 refers to the types of messages that fall
under the DNC regime, which describes the method of
communication (and nature of a “message”) and the “speci-
fied” content, purpose or substance of the message, mainly
commercial messages that promote or advertise goods or
services, which was rightly pointed out to be the main
concern (subsection (1)).102 However, the list of specified
messages is left open and “can potentially be expanded to
include messages with purposes other than marketing in the
future:”103 for example, non-profit or commercial messages
(e.g. from charitable and religious organisations), corre-
spondences for the conduct of market research or surveys,
political messages and messages from public agencies.
Currently, these types of messages are excluded under the
Eighth Schedule to the Act. This is a fair approach to take and
it maintains a flexibility to meet future needs and concerns
when they should arise or escalate.104 It is also to be noted
that the scope of the DNC regime is defined by the nature of
the message rather than the originating party. The jurisdic-
tion provision requires that the specified message is
addressed to a Singapore telephone number where either the
sender or the recipient is within jurisdiction when the mes-
sage is sent or accessed respectively.105
Under this regime, the duty to comply lies on the “person”
(as opposed to an “organisation”) under section 43(1). A “per-
son” is defined under the Interpretation Act (Cap. 1) as
including “include any company or association or body of
persons, corporate or unincorporated”. Hence, this obligation
and responsibility to comply will apply to the organisation
that wants to send out a specified message as well as any
intermediary serving as agent or contractor and as a conduit
of information (contrast this to the exclusions under section 4
and the personal data protection regime contained in Parts III
to VI, which does not apply to this Part). Hence, it applies to
every link in the chain that ‘pushes’ information to an indi-
vidual (generally, as potential consumers). It will apply to
telemarketing companies and other organisations that
perform such functions on behalf of another.106
96 Section 26.
97 E.g. the US-EU (and US-Switzerland) Safe Harbour Framework
arrangement providing for a streamlined process for US organi-
sations to comply with the EU privacy standards and to be rec-
ognised as such. See the US International Trade Administration
website at: http://ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/menu.html. See also the
Export.gov website at: http://export.gov/safeharbor/.
98 See the EC Factsheet on Data Protection Reform: How Will the
EU’s Data Protection Reform Make International Cooperation Easier?,
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
document/review2012/factsheets/5_en.pdf.
99 See Warren B. Chik, Data Protection Laws and Marketing Practices
(Singapore Law Gazette, September 2011), available at: http://
www.lawgazette.com.sg/2011-09/195.htm.
100 Part IX.
101 Section 40.
102 CP 3 para. 2.143.
103 Ibid. These are some of the types of messages that are placed
in the Eighth Schedule for exclusion from the meaning of
“specified message” (see section 37(5)).
104 To the recipient of unsolicited messages or calls from non-
business entities such as non-profit, religious or charitable or-
ganisations, commerciality or otherwise is not an issue and it can
still constitute as much a nuisance as business-related marketing
communications. Hence, the authorities should keep track of the
increase in such messages and act when it is determined that it
has become a real problem.
105 Section 38.
106 However, the Act provides for a defence to an “employee”
acting in good faith and within the scope of his job. Section 48.
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2.4.2. One-time one-stop opt-out for potential consumers
As noted, the DNC Registry and its function are contained in
Part IX of the PCPA. The DNC list approach is a fair compro-
mise between an “opt-out” and “opt-in” approach. In fact, it
combines both approaches by giving the consumer the power
to decide whether to receive all ‘push’ messages or only ‘pull’
messages. It makes it practicable for individuals to actually
utilise the general “opt-out” procedure,107 while it permits
“specific opt-in” as an exception for commercial outreach for
businesses.108
The DNC regime is based on a “filtering approach”. That is,
the sender will be required to check the registry within a “pre-
scribed duration” of sending messages (including the making of
calls) and receive confirmation that the number is not listed
before doing so.109 The duty to check the register regularly lies on
the sender (rather than duty to request un-subscription lying on
the recipient as in the case of the spamregime).110 The onus is on
the sender not to send a specified message addressed to a
Singapore telephone number in contravention of the Act.111
Those that fail to comply can be fined up to S$10,000.112
As noted, the regime supplements the primary “opt-out”
approachwith a prospective “opt-in” approach tomarketingma-
terials or “specified messages to Singapore telephone numbers”
forthoseconsumerswiththeir telephonenumbers intheDNClist.
Specific opt-ins will override the general opt-out and can be
excludedfromthelistthathastobesentformonthlyfilteringbyan
organisation.113Thiscanbecontrastedtotheheavilypro-business
approach taken towards spam in the 2007 legislation.
2.4.3. “Contact information” and the “calling line identity”
Of great significance, and an integral part of the DNC regime,
are the duties to provide contact information and the non-
concealment of calling line identity.114 Also, the proposed
small quantity number lookup service.115
Among itsobligations, sendersare requiredto include intheir
“specifiedmessage”, “clear andaccurate information identifying
the individual or organisation who sent or authorised the
sending of the specified message”.116 They also have to provide
contact information for consumers to reach them.117 Thus, it
would appear that the sender has the option displaying the
originating number or other suitable contact with the message
(thatmaybea telephonenumber, ane-mail addressoranyother
mannerof contact). Thiswouldapply to specifiedmessages sent
through SMS, MMS and other similar text-based platforms.
For specified messages sent through telephone calls and
fax messages, the sender will be required to display the orig-
inating number (“calling line”) of the call.118 They are also not
allowed to use any methods (“operation”) or seek any assis-
tance (“issue any instructions”) in “concealing or withholding
from the recipient the calling line identity of the sender”,119
which will presumably apply to them applying for any pri-
vate line services from telephone companies. Again, the
penalty is S$10,000 for contravening the above.120
In fact, consistent with these provisions, the current prac-
tice by telephone companies providing for private lines (while
at the sametimechargingusers for caller IDservices) shouldbe
discontinued. This will disallow callers from making anony-
mous calls thereby impeding the reporting and investigations
into potential offences and thus allow for more effective
enforcement of theAct.121 Of course, the blanket prohibition of
these services will remove the revenue generated by tele-
communication companies. Moreover, the prohibition could
prevent the use of private lines by other organisations and
individuals that do not fall under the DNC regime, which may
have to be given more consideration. However, there may be
more pros than cons even in this regard.122
2.4.4. Operational matters
Most of the compliance mechanisms are required to be put in
place by the PDPC,123 rather than the sender that merely have
to consult and observe the register in accordance with the
PDPA. Moreover, to assist individuals and small organisations
(like Small and Medium Enterprises (“SMEs”)) the DNC Regis-
try is expected to offer a small quantity number lookup service
for them that will allow them to input phone numbers
manually into an online form to check if those numbers are
107 Contrast this to the approach under the SCA for unsolicited
commercial electronic messages. There is also the option for
specific “opt-out” under the PDPA for those who prefer not to use
the general “opt-out” option as well as in relation to messages
that an individual make have specifically “opted-in” for. Section
47. The “withdrawal of consent” option also applies to messages
subscribed to before the commencement of Part IX (subsection
(4)).
108 It is to be noted that if there have been specific consent given,
then the placing of the number by an individual on the DNC
Registry is not regarded as a withdrawal of consent. Section 47(5).
This may dilute the useful and effect of the regime somewhat,
depending on what amounts to (and whether there was) valid
consent. Consent is not defined although invalid forms of consent
include consent obtained by deception or that is unreasonable in
relation to the purposes specified under section 46.
109 “Sender” is defined under section 36 as including a person
who “sends”, “causes to be sent” and “authorises the sending” of
the message (through text or by “voice call”).
110 Section 43.
111 Ibid.
112 Section 43(2).
113 However, section 47(4) will include consent given prior to the
commencement of Part IX and the subsequent registration of a
telephone number. This will weaken the objective of the regime
somewhat.
114 Sections 44 and 45 respectively. “Calling line identity” is
defined under section 36(1) as “the telephone number or infor-
mation identifying the sender”.
115 Most of the respondents to CP 2 agreed that organisations
should be required to use identifiable originating numbers that
can be detected and displayed to send their messages. This is the
approach taken in Canada, for instance, where telemarketers are
required to display the originating number.
116 Section 44(1)(a).
117 Section 44(1)(b).
118 Section 45(1)(a).
119 Section 45(1)(b).
120 Sections 44(2) and 45(2) respectively.
121 Powers of investigation should extend to tracing non-
compliant organisations and anonymous “unknown” calls. This
prohibition will make investigations easier.
122 E.g. requiring transparency can allow call recipients to track
cyberstalkers, the source of harassing calls and the like.
123 Part IX, Division 2; in particular, section 39.
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registered with the DNC Registry and thereby alleviate their
burden and promote compliance.124
3. Future developments in personal data
protection regime: assessing international PDP
trends and proposals for future improvements to
data privacy laws
3.1. Public and private interests and the various
stakeholders in relation to personal data
The movement towards greater recognition of an individual’s
privacy and personal data rights and the optimization of
communications technology comes into conflict with the use
of such media as an effective tool for commercial and social
outreach.125 The measures in the PDPA were clearly meant to
balance different private and public interests vis-a`-vis per-
sonal data. These include the following opposing interests:
The optimisation of communications technology versus digi-
tal marketing interests;126 consumer interest versus business
interest; employer and employee interest; and so on.
3.1.1. Public interest considerations
The right to greater protection of private personal information,
such as through a law of confidence has to be weighed against
the right to free speech and expression.127 Similarly, a balance
also has to be made when constructing a PDP regime to sup-
plement the existing privacy laws with freedom of speech and
the free flow of information. This will have to be done based on
national socio-economic policy and strategy, but also taking
into consideration international norms and obligations. As
noted, the main challenge is in forming a fair and equitable
regime that takes into account the individual’s human right to
privacy and the benefits of optimising information technology
on the one hand, and the economic benefits of allowing, to a
reasonable extent, organisations to collect and use personal
data for “legitimate and reasonable” purposes on the other.128
In its consultation process with regard to the PDP law,
MICA also expressed the key objectives of the proposed data
protection reforms as the safeguarding of consumers’ per-
sonal data, the promotion of greater consumer trust in the
private sector,129 and the enhancement of Singapore’s posi-
tion as an attractive jurisdiction for global data management
and processing services. The government is concerned with
the overall effectiveness of social media, modern telecom-
munications, the information-based economy and human
productivity, all of which factor into the policy analysis.
The drafters of the PDPA have also taken into consideration
other interests and parties when framing and formulating the
rights, responsibilities and liabilities under the Act. For
example, “data intermediaries” that are merely conduits for
data flow (i.e. “data processors”) do not face the same level of
responsibility as “data controllers”. This is consistent with
Singapore’s drive to be a hub for data processing activities (e.g.
for local hosting and cloud providers).130 Individuals can still
look to the “data controllers” for compliance and redress under
the Act. This acknowledges the realities of the real interests
surrounding the collection, use, management and handling of
personal data and allocates the responsibilities accordingly.
3.1.2. Private interest considerations
Overlapping with the socio-economic policy factors are the
private interests of businesses for a pro-business environ-
ment and the personal concerns of individuals and consumers
relating to personal privacy. This is borne out by the statistics
on the responses to the public consultations, which consists
of feedback mainly from organisations, especially business
organisations, and consumers.131
It is to be noted that the feedback and voting statistics of
the abovementioned stakeholders have been taken into ac-
count during MICA’s decision-making process and they have
also been taken into consideration in this paper where rele-
vant to support arguments for and against suggested
amendments and proposed follow-up development and
improvement of the PDP regime.
In the course of the proposals for future reform to the
regime, reference will be made to the current disputes
involving the various stakeholders and the global PDP trends
and developments in other jurisdictions that have gone
beyond the current framework uponwhich the PDPA is based.
Coincidentally, there have been many new augmentations
that have been put in place in recent years and also some
important studies and suggestions by various governmental
and regional organisations that have been published in 2012,
notably in the US and the EU. A study of the new and evolving
issues and the current and novel solutions that are proposed
will be useful for any improvements that can bemade not only
to the Singapore PDP regime but also any other country which
is also developing its laws in this area.
The proposals contained in this part of the paper aremeant
for consideration in future statutory amendments and regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to the PDPA aswell as to follow-
on actions that can and should bemade to ensure a robust and
124 CP 2 para. 3.28. MCA have decided to include this service as a
feature of the DNC Registry due to the strong support from re-
spondents. See CP 3 para. 2.174.
125 Warren Chik, Data Protection Laws and Marketing Practices
(September Issue, Singapore Law Gazette), available at: http://
www.lawgazette.com.sg/2011-09/195.htm.
126 E.g. reflected in the DNC Registry to deal with telemarketing
practices involving use of personal contact information, in
particular, telephone numbers.
127 George Wei, Milky Way and Andromeda: Privacy, Confidentiality
and Freedom of Expression, 18 SAcLJ 1 (2006).
128 CP 3, para. 1.1 e 1.2.
129 See Tan Wei Ming, Protecting Personal Information Takes Good
Governance (Business Times, 2 April 2009). “Good governance is
key to managing this substantial amount of information flow and
also to safeguard against any misuse of personal data. Inadequate
governance, as seen from recent financial troubles, can cause
tremendous uncertainty and fear. A sound governance model,
when adequately enforced, will give people greater confidence to
communicate and transact, whether in the physical or online
world.” Ibid.
130 CP 3 para. 2.25.
131 See MCA Press Release, MICA Seeks Feedback on Proposed Per-
sonal Data Protection Act (MICA, 19 March 2012), available at: http://
app.mica.gov.sg/Default.aspx?
tabid¼79&ctl¼Details&mid¼540&ItemID¼1384.
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effective holistic personal data protection regime and one that
is in keeping with the times. These include suggested im-
provements to the PDP regime in the Singapore context for
future legislation or subsidiary regulations. These suggestions
will also be useful to other countries that are contemplating
an update to their data protection legislation as well as to
those that are still in the process of drafting comprehensive
and data privacy legislation.
3.2. Improvements and recommendations to strengthen
the protection of personal data
3.2.1. Specific legislation for the protection of personal
information from and of children and other vulnerable groups
(e.g. senior citizens and the mentally incompetent)
“Sensitive data” can be either dealt with under other laws,
which is the Singapore approach, or under the general data
protection law, which is the case under the Malaysian data
protection law (and the proposed EU Data Protection Regula-
tion (“DPR”))132. Since therewas a clear decision not to put into
place specific rules for the protection of sensitive information
in the PDPA, there should bemore laws to follow to provide for
special or additional protections that are not already put in
place. Those that are already provided for include the treat-
ment of government, financial and health information; but
those that are currently not specifically addressed include
information collected from and regarding vulnerable groups
of society like children and other vulnerable groups.
Some jurisdictions have put in place enhanced protections
for vulnerable groups, in particular children, who may be
targeted for personal data and also exposed to other online
business schemes, such as those in the gaming industry.
These protections involve the surrender, use and sharing of
personal and third party data. One example is the Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”)133 in the
United States, which together with the US Federal Trade
Commission’s (“FTC”) implementing regulations,134 provide
formore stringent protectivemeasures for children such as by
requiring that online services directed to or at children, or that
know that they are collecting personal information from
children, must obtain verifiable consent from the parent or
guardian. Subsequent legislation further protecting children
online have also been proposed in the US following COPPA.135
Thus, even in the US, they are still looking at what is required
to maintain such protection in the light of changes in tech-
nology and the digital environment and their effects on chil-
dren’s data. For instance, the Obama Administration is
looking into the possibility of restricting or prohibiting the
creation of individual profiles on children information irre-
spective of consent.136
In the feedback to CP 3, it was noted that the respondents
to the consultation have also suggested more stringent re-
quirements for children’s data. Thus, themanner of collecting
and the use and dissemination of data on children should be
protected, and the type of data that can be collected on chil-
dren, irrespective of consent, should also be limited.
Article 8 of the EU’s draft DPR also sets out additional
conditions for the lawfulness of the processing of data about
children in relation to information society services directly
offered to them. The term “child” is defined as a person under
the age of 13 years, rendering it consistent with the definition
in the US’ COPPA.
3.2.2. Provisions prohibiting the trade and sale of personal
data
In line with the philosophy that a person remain themaster of
his or her personal data, which is only shared or ‘licensed’ to
third parties for specific uses for as long as permission is
granted, the further dissemination of personal information to
third parties by a data collector for commercial gain should be
disallowed as a matter of principle as it elevates other parties’
interest over the individual’s.
Generally, the sharing of information collected with, and
collection on behalf of, parent company or subsidiaries, “af-
filiates” or other organisations by a data collector must be
specifically spelt out and explained to the individual (e.g.
specific organisations or identifiable affiliates and the reason
for such sharing). This should be the case even if the infor-
mation collector need not be responsible for notifying the
third party organisation on the withdrawal of consent by the
subject. “Data sharing” that is pursuant to ambiguous terms
(e.g. “any affiliates” and “where necessary”) and without
adequate informed consent should not be allowed.
Referrals or indirect obtaining of data from third parties
should at least be restricted and discouraged as a form of
132 See Note 30, above. The definition of “sensitive data” would be
expanded to include genetic data and criminal convictions or
related security measures under Article 9, which sets out the
general prohibition for processing special categories of personal
data (and the exceptions from this general rule), building on
Article 8 of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC).
133 Pub. L. 105-277 (codified at 15 U.S.C. xx 6501-6506), which
entered into effect in 2000. COPPA defines “child” to mean “an
individual under the age of 13.” 15 U.S.C. x 6501(1). The Act only
apply to the website “operator” or online service that are either
“directed at children” or that collect “personal information” from
and of children or both. Teenagers are also a vulnerable group
and should also be given additional protections as well, especially
since they are also the generation that is growing up with new
technology and a main target for the online gaming industry. See
also, Lauren A. Matecki, COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps
for Protecting Youth Privacy Rights in the Social Networking Era, 5 Nw.
J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 369, (2010). noting the lessons that can be learnt
from studying the effectiveness of COPPA after a decade since it
entered into effect and proposing improvements to take into ac-
count the technological changes since then (namely, the prolif-
eration of social networking websites) and the need for
comprehensive online privacy protection for all adolescents, not
just children under the age of 13.Other proposals include limited
opt-in requirements (i.e. different levels of protection between
children under 13 years of age, teenagers between 13 to 18 years
old and those above 18) and more comprehensive notice and
consent procedures. Ibid. at 399-402.
134 The FTC has since issued a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”,
proposing changes to the COPPA Rule to address changes in
technology in September 2011. See the FTC Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 59804 (proposed on 27
September 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ os/2011/09/
110915coppa.pdf.
135 See Note 176, below, on the proposed prohibition on tracking
children online.
136 See 3.3.2., the White House Paper or CPBOR at pp. 17-18.
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practice. This is because it can in effect give rise to a de facto
“opt-out” regime, which goes against the fundamental prin-
ciples of the data protection rules and privacy principles, and
the tenor of the Act. Even the suggestion that “the organisa-
tion may ask the referrer to confirm that consent had been
given by the referred individuals”137 is unsatisfactory as there
is no safeguard from abuse and no direct consequences for the
organisation.
The terms for the sharing of data should be fair to con-
sumers. Even if the data protection or privacy principles are
followed, there should be some minimum level of protection
in cases where there is a high likelihood of abuse. This has to
dowith the sale of customer’s personal data to unrelated third
parties, for unrelated purposes, based on ambiguous grounds
and especially for monetary gain. The Hong Kong Octopus
incident in 2010 is an example of the latter. It is also an
example of the need for the Commissioner to have powers to
impose penalties and to award compensation upon a finding
of contravention of the Act (whichwas the case in the Octopus
incident);138 and the powers of community pressure especially
from interest groups (if they are sufficiently empowered and
educated on their rights).139 Octopus Holdings is the biggest
electronic payment operator in Hong Kong and it operates the
Octopus Rewards Program (related to its rechargeable con-
tactless stored value smart card for electronic payment),
which collected customer data that was transferred without
permission to third parties for direct marketing purposes in
return for monetary gain. These included banks, telecom-
munication operators and insurance companies.140 The
companywas sanctioned and it subsequently voluntarily took
remedial measures.141
Thus, the sharing of information for a price or for com-
mercial gain, and even as a form of business, should be pro-
hibited.142 Organisations that create or sell data to individuals
should not have the right to sell the same information and
other personal details obtained to third parties for profit. For
example, the sale of marketing lists containing telephone
numbers by telephone companies that issue those same
numbers should not be allowed as it additionally involves a
potential conflict of interests. The rationale for this proposed
ban on commercialisation of personal information can also be
based on the need to protect consumers from unfair
contractual terms and licensing provisions being imposed in
circumstances that do not allow free choice. Moreover, in
most cases involving the sale of personal information, the
reason for collection and the sharing for payment purpose is
often either not stated or not clearly explained in the terms of
agreement or the privacy policy concerned. In fact, even in
relation to transfer not by way of trade or sale, MICA has
clarified that the intention is not to allow the carte blanche
transfer of personal data among or within organisations
without consent.143
3.2.3. The right to be forgotten
The “Right to be Forgotten” allows an individual to have a
clean slate, particularly on the Internet. It acts like an “eraser
button” for personal online information.144 A “Right to Be
Forgotten” will help one manage data protection risks online.
When a person no longer wants his or her personal data to be
processed and there are no legitimate grounds for retaining it,
the datawill be deleted. The primary objective of the rules is to
empower individuals. It is not about erasing past events or
restricting the freedom of the press.145 However, it is logical
for there to be somemisgivings to the right, which can conflict
with the interests of Internet controllers and intermediaries
(as noted above), and even the Internet as a whole (and free
speech and expression online).146
Unlike the “Do Not Call” and “Do Not Track” regimes
(considered below), it will have retroactive effect, as it requires
the removal of personal data that was previouslymade public.
This right to expunge personal information is consistent with
privacy rights principles and the fundamental user consent/
control rule. Certainly, it can have a real and tangible (and in
some cases, also a negative) effect on an individual if there is
no such right.147
The greatest impact of any rule on the Right to be Forgotten
will be on social networking sites and information locator
services. The former bases its entire business model on in-
formation sharing on different scales or levels, while the latter
uses publicly available information as identifiers for search
algorithm, indexing and presentation.
Facebook, which is the preeminent social networking
website today, has a track record of putting into place lib-
eral privacy policies. It’s preference for loosening privacy
137 CP 3 para. 2.47.
138 Allan Chiang, Keynote Address at the Symposium on Personal Data
and Privacy Protection: A Comparative Perspective, Council Chamber,
University of Hong Kong (Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data
of Hong Kong, 10 February 2012) at p. 2 para. 4, available at: http://
www.pcpd.org.hk/english/files/infocentre/speech_20120210.pdf.
139 Ibid. at p. 1 para. 2.
140 Ibid. at p. 7 para. 3.
141 Octopus, The Board of Octopus Holdings Limited (OHL) Accepts
Recommendations of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data, Hong
Kong Monetary Authority, and the OHL Special Committee, (Press
Release, 19 October 2010), available at: http://www.octopus.com.
hk/release/detail/2010/en/20101019b.html.
142 This can be differentiated from “business asset transaction”
for collection and disclosure without consent under the Third
Schedule, section 2 and the Fifth Schedule, sections 1(s) and 4.
143 CP 3 para. 2.83.
144 See the FTC Report at Section IV.D.2.b. (p.70).
145 EC Factsheet on Data Protection Reform: Why Do We Need an
EU Data Protection Reform?, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/review2012/factsheets/1_en.
pdf; EC Factsheet on Data Protection Reform: How Does the Data
Protection Reform Strengthen Citizens’ Rights?, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/
review2012/factsheets/2_en.pdf; and EC Factsheet on Data Pro-
tection Reform: How Will the Data Protection Reform Affect So-
cial Networks?, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/factsheets/3_en.pdf.
146 Jeffrey Rosen, The Right To Be Forgotten, 64 Stan. L. Rev. Online
88 (13 February 2012), available at: http://www.
stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-
forgotten, characterizing it as a “clash between European and
American conceptions of the proper balance between privacy and
free speech”. (Rosen 1)
147 See e.g. Brett Lovelace, Web Photo Haunts Graduate; MU Sued for
Denying Degree (Intelligencer J., 27 April 2007), at A1. See also,
Vinod Sreeharsha, Google and Yahoo Win Appeal in Argentine Case
(N.Y. Times, 20 August 2010), at B4. Cited in Rosen 2 at fn 28 & 39
respectively.
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default settings and its influence on user behaviour and
attitudes towards data sharing are significant. There were
many incidents and disputes against Facebook involving
allegations of privacy violations that show no signs of
abatement.148 The introduction and use of an automatic
facial recognition feature in June 2011 and “tag sugges-
tions” for third parties as well as the current Facebook
Timeline feature are some of the latest changes that have
privacy implications. In fact, recognising some sort of right
to erase personal data from Facebook has led to its policy
for its “making inaccessible” personal data within a
reasonable time.149
Google offers another useful case study based on the ten-
sions between its operations and functions on the one hand
and privacy interest of others on the other. Google’s practice
of caching and presenting data even after it is taken down
from the original source and its foray into cloud computing
are also setting off privacy alarms.
In the US, legislation has been introduced that gives teen-
agers an eraser button, which will allow them to erase certain
materials on social networking sites.150 The Right to be
Forgotten is also tagged as a key change in the current EU drive
towards reforming their data protection framework. The Eu-
ropean Commission (“EC”) is taking the lead in promulgating
such a right o for all, not just for the younger segment of so-
ciety as proposed in the US. Article 17 of the proposed Data
Protection Regulation (“DPR”),151 “provides the data subject’s
right to be forgotten and to erasure.”152 Under this provision,
the “Right to be Forgotten” includes the right to obtain erasure,
and abstain from further dissemination, any public Internet
link to, copy of, or replication of the personal data relating to
the data subject contained in any publicly available commu-
nication service in specific circumstances. It also integrates
the right to have the processing restricted in certain cases. The
data controller have the obligation to inform third parties that
processes such data and take reasonable steps to deal with
data that it is responsible for publishing.153
Although the principle is sound and the objective is admi-
rable, the extent of this right (which cannot be absolute) and
the role of the Internet intermediaries and controllers, have to
be made clear so as to minimize the burden on the messenger
and limit any adverse effects that it may have on free speech
and expression.154 The parameters of the right, and the role of
the conduit, are still in the process of evolution;155 and de-
velopments in this area should be carefully followed with a
view to its adoption or at least observance in Singapore (due to
transnational obligations to meet EU standards in order for
unrestricted data flow from those jurisdictions) in the future.
The focus should remain primarily on the duty to abstain
from further dissemination and invisibility of the data rather
than on the responsibility to trace and expunge such data
from archives; although the destruction of such data is also an
important aspect of the right. The content provider should
remain primarily responsible for removing personal infor-
mation upon a request for erasure (whether or not relayed
through a conduit via a “notice and taken down” regime or any
other form of notice), unless the said content provider has a
legal basis for keeping the information available in spite of the
request, which in the case of data residing with a data inter-
mediary, may require a “put back” request followed by a de-
fense of the posting in a court of law.
There should be two regimes for conduits in relation to the
request to erase personally uploaded data (self-posted) and
third party data (third party posted). With regard to self-
erasure, Data intermediaries and controllers should follow
the instructions of the uploader with prospective effect and
within a reasonable timeframe. With regard to third party
posts, data intermediaries (the secondary intermediary) can
take on a more protected (and ‘neutral’) role in a “notice and
take down” type of regime; whereas data controllers should
remain responsible for the third party material. In this way,
the burden will not be as great for data intermediaries as they
will benefit from the extension of the ‘safe harbour’ regime
that is already applicable under copyright law (and perhaps
also under content regulations).
148 Civil society groups and privacy advocates have taken on the
role of privacy watchdog and Facebook is one of the main targets.
See e.g. the Electronic Frontier Foundation (https://www.eff.org/
issues/privacy), PrivacyAdvocates.CA (http://privacyadvocates.
ca/) and Europe v. Facebook (http://www.europe-v-facebook.org).
149 See In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3184 (Nov. 29,
2011), (proposed consent order), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0923184/index.shtm and http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/
0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf. Facebook agreed to make
inaccessible data that a user deletes within thirty days time. Of
course, “making inaccessible” is different from deletion and
Facebook should also take the next step of expunging the said
data from its archives after removal from display.
150 Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Congress
(2011). See e.g. Facebook, How Do I Remove a Wall Post or Story?,
available at: http://www.facebook.com/ help/?
page¼174851209237562 and LinkedIn’s Privacy Policy, available
at: http://www.linkedin.com/static?key¼privacy_policy. The Act
includes a provision for an “eraser button” so that young con-
sumers and Internet users can eliminate publicly available con-
tent about themselves.
151 DPR p. 51-2 (Text). The European Commission published its
proposal for a new Data Protection Regulation (“DPR”) to replace
the 16 year old Data Protection Directive on 25 January 2012. See
the Europa website at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/index_en.htm. One of the centrepieces of the pro-
posed DPR to strengthen data protection is the introduction of the
provision on the “Right To Be Forgotten” (the current right to
erasure under Article 12(b) of Directive 95/46/EC is more limited).
Another centrepiece for the enhancement of individual rights is
the “Right to Data Portability”. Other major proposals include the
shift to an “explicit” consent requirement and the introduction of
some new concepts not in Directive 95/46/EC, such as breach of
security, special protection for children’s data and health data,
use of binding corporate rules and the requirement for a data
protection officer.
152 Article 17(1) of the DPR. See also DPR p.9 at para. 3.4.3.3
(Explanatory Memorandum). See also p.25 at para.53 (Preamble).
153 Article 17(2) of the DPR. See also DPR p.26 at para.54
(Preamble).
154 Rosen 1 at Note 146. Analysing the ambiguities in the current
provisions and explaining the need for further refinement and
clarification before any such legal instrument should be passed.
See also Articles 17(3)(a) read with 80 of the DPR.
155 Spain’s National Court has asked the ECJ for judicial guidance
on jurisdictional issues in relation to Google’s privacy practices
arising from individual complaints and requests for erasure.
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In the meantime, it may be advisable for Internet control-
lers to take some interim measures to avoid exacerbating the
uncontrollable proliferation and perpetuation of personal in-
formation.156 For example, they can consider using techno-
logical solutions,157 such as a “digital expiration date” or
“digital speed bumps” to limit the ‘life’ of online data. For
example, search algorithms in information locator tools or
services can incorporate a ‘drop date’ (i.e. information dele-
tion) for WWW information from its search results.158 Face-
book Timeline chronicles could perhaps allow for deletion by
cut-off date in its privacy settings.
3.3. Improvements and recommendations to the DNC
regime
3.3.1. Expanding the coverage of the DNC Registry to
electronic mail and other digital messaging platforms
Under Part 2 of this paper on the DNC Registry, it was
explained that the DNC regime applies to specified messages
sent to Singapore telephone numbers. That would include any
forms of electronic communication channels that rely on the
telephone number including Voice over Internet Protocol
(“VoIP”) technology. However, it will clearly excludemessages
sent over VoIP that do not rely on the telephone number or
electronic mail and other forms of junk mail (such as junk
mail by post).159 Electronicmail (“e-mail”) was excluded due to
the existence of the Spam Control Act (Cap. 311A) of 2007
(“SCA”). When dealing with measures against electronic
messages, it is inevitable that comparisons are made to the
existing SCA, which deals with the posting unsolicited elec-
tronic bulk messages and the collection of personal contact
information. There is an obvious overlap between the objec-
tives and coverage of the PDPA, and the DNC Registry in
particular, with the SCA in relation to unsolicited messages.
However, it has already been argued elsewhere that the
SCA is highly ineffective and should perhaps be repealed.160 In
fact, there tends to be a greater abuse andmisuse of electronic
mail addresses generally, which is a problem that the SCA fail
to addressed. It is proposed that, in its place, the control of
unwanted e-mails as well as the current regulations on e-
mails should be incorporated into the DNC regime. That will
provide a more comprehensive, consistent and harmonized
approach to unwanted messages irrespective of the mode of
communication or the need for a telephone address. It should
also be noted that SMS and MMS are also covered under the
SCA, but nevertheless they are still included under the DNC
regime.161 Moreover, e-mails are also a form of personal
identifiable information covered by the rest of the PDPA as
well, which makes it quite inconsistent not to be covered
under the DNC regime. Doing so will also reconcile the
approach to unwanted messages which will otherwise be
inconsistent, with a general “opt-out” approach under the
DNC regime and a specific “opt-out” approach under the SCA.
The formerwill bemore consumer friendly as a one-time one-
stop opt-out regime from all unwanted messages (which
makes receiving such correspondences effectively an opt-in
regime).
As noted, other useful provisions and regulations that
apply in cases where there has not been an opt-out exercised
by individuals can be incorporated into the PDPA. These
include the provisions against dictionary attacks and use of
address harvesting software,162 and the compliance re-
quirements for legitimate sending of spam (e.g. labelling and
other requirements as well as the establishment of an
unsubscribe facility).163 Doing so can also enable the PPDPC to
take on an additional role in monitoring and in taking
enforcement measures against spam, which the current SCA
regime has also failed to do.164
Modern call and messaging systems are varied and can
include computer or smartphone applications or “apps” (e.g.
WhatsApp, Line, Skype, Vonage and others), which can also be
identified by telephone number. However, as in the case of e-
mails, there is a potential loophole with regard to messages
sent through computers and smartphone mobile device apps
that may not do so, such as through cell broadcast or the
combination of online 3G/wifi connection/access and online
156 See also Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the “Tower Of Babel”: A
“Right To Be Forgotten” and How Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-
Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age Of Analytics, 22 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 69 (2011), positing a more principled
approach without over-regulating.
157 Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free Speech
in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1525, 1535
(2012), preferring these types of measures (“blob machine-like
solutions”) as less complicated and more effective, given the
legal complexities and problems of jurisdictional prescription and
enforcement. (Rosen 2)
158 Sonya Angelica Diehn (Cyrus Farivar ed.), Spanish Firm Loses
‘Right to be Forgotten’ Case (Deuthsche Welle 28 February 2012),
citing a proposal by Viktor Mayer-Scho¨nberger, a professor at the
Oxford Internet Institute and author of “Delete: The Virtue of
Forgetting in the Digital Age”, available at: http://www.dw.de/dw/
article/0,,15774283,00.html.
159 There are some telephony communications systems that do
not require a telephone number or line. For example, the use of
VoIP such as Skype calls/messaging between computers and non-
telephone devices as well as through Internet platforms such as
Vonage calls/messaging via Facebook, although admittedly the
problem of spam through such mediums is not a problem as yet.
160 See e.g. Warren Chik, Proposed Anti-Spam Legislation Model in
Singapore e Are We Losing the War Before Even Starting the Battle?,
[2005] 17 SAcLJ 747.
161 MICA noted the distinct treatment in its CP 3 report at para. 2.
148.
162 Part II, sections 8 and 9 of the SCA. As the methods and
technology used to collect contact information (“electronic
address”) have developed since the Act was enacted, it is also
perhaps timely to revisit and amend/expand these provisions to
take into account these new practices and prescribe them as of-
fences; or in line with the suggestions in this paper, incorporate
the existing and newer offence provisions into the PDP regime.
163 Part III read with the Second Schedule.
164 It has been asserted elsewhere that the legislation, in its
current form, is woefully inadequate for many reasons such as a
lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. It has been recom-
mended by this author before that the government needs to take
the lead in enforcement as it is not realistic to expect individuals
or civil society groups to do so. This can now be done by dele-
gating the responsibility to the PPDPC, which is a government
agency. See Warren B. Chik, Proposed Anti-Spam Legislation Model In
Singapore: Are We Losing The War Before Even Starting The Battle?,
[2005] 17 SAcLJ 747 and Karthik Ashwin Thiagarajan, The Spam
Control Act 2007, [2007] 2 SJLS 361.
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accounts. As such, the limitation to the “Singapore telephone
number” may not suffice in the long run. In the future and
when the time is right, the coverage of the DNC regime should
also be extended to specified messages addressed to IP ad-
dresses and personal online accounts (and thus any form of
communications technology hosted by a wifi and/or online
service) as well. In the meantime, it will suffice for the situa-
tion to be monitored, and the technologies and various modes
of communication to be studied and categorized to keep pace
with communications technology in order to prepare for the
eventuality of inclusion.165
On the other hand, junk mail delivered by post is not
addressed in either Act because it is arguably less of a problem
given the cost involved and the effective use of anti-junk mail
devices, which makes it less of a privacy (but more of an
environmental) issue.166
3.3.2. The US do not track proposal
There are legislative developments in the that relate to per-
sonal privacy online vis-a`-vis the invasive nature of online
organisations that base their business model on personal
identifiable information, not just contact information but also
through the study of behavioural patterns, personal profiling
as well as the perpetuation of personal data such as through
web caching and archiving. These developments should also
be followed with a view to possible inclusion into the regime,
if and when they become relevant to the local context.
Although the United States (“US”) do not have a compre-
hensive data protection regime at the federal level, there are
some legislation at the federal as well as the state level. For
example, the US has a Privacy Act of 1974;167 sectoral legisla-
tion providing for data privacy for specific subjects (e.g. chil-
dren and the disabled)168 or type of information; and also
some states have enacted similar legislation applicable within
their own jurisdiction.169 There have also been regular at-
tempts to incrementally reinforce privacy protection.170 It is
significant to note that there have recently been greater po-
litical interests in the personal data protection and privacy of
individuals that are linked to the prominent cases of data
breaches by the likes of Google and Facebook. Information is
not only currency for these Internet businesses but it is
sometimes also integral to their business model and the
technology that they use.
There are many online tracking technologies with varying
purposes offering different levels of openness and user con-
trol.171 The widespread and increasing use of such techno-
logical devices is a cause of concern for privacy advocates. The
most prominent example is the use of the “web browser
cookie”, which like other such technologies also give rise to
privacy concerns. Cookies has many uses including some that
are important to web browsing and are largely beneficial to
users such as for authentication and security. One main
function of cookies is to track users’ browsing history that can
be used to improve efficiency and customer service. However,
tracking cookies, such as the “third-party cookie” can also be
used to profile users’ behavioural patterns and online foot-
prints in order to send targeted advertisements. This has
privacy implications and the surreptitious way that cookies
are installed and the lack of understanding of its various
functions may be an impediment to the full exercise of user
consent and control of their personal identifiable data online.
As noted, more recent and prominent cases of the liberal
tracking and profiling of users have been performed by social
networking platforms like Facebook and information locator
services like Google. Facebook has had a track record of pri-
vacy violations and liberal default privacy settings and clauses
geared towards greater sharing of information between users
as well as greater control over user information on its part.172
The Google Street View location database project conducted
by Google Inc., which led to the collection of “payload data”
that was not needed for the project, led to an investigation by
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).173
Recognising the increasing challenges posed to personal
data privacy posed by some forms of digital technology and
Internet businesses, President Barack Obama produced a
White Paper on “ConsumerData Privacy in aNetworkedWorld:
A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation
in the Global Digital Economy” (“White House Paper”), other-
wise known as the “Consumer PrivacyAct of Rights” (“CPBOR”),
in February 2012. This was followed by the Federal Trade
Commission, which recently produced a Report on “Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommenda-
tions for Businesses and Policymakers” (“FTCReport”) inMarch
2012. A significant recommendation in these documents was
the adoption of Do Not Track (“DNT”) mechanisms to allow
165 CP 3 paras. 2.151-3.
166 The SCA also does not extend to junk mail or faxes. It also
does not cover telephone calls (see section 4(3) of the Act, where a
message sent through a voice call that is made using a telephone
service is excluded from the definition of an “electronic mes-
sage”). Telephone calls (as opposed to text messages) are also not
messages sent in bulk and do not constitute an electronic mes-
sage, although they are often commercial in nature.
167 5 USC x 552a (Pub. L. 93-579,88 Stat. 1896).
168 See e.g., Note 133-6, above.
169 There are also common law privacy laws such as tort-based
invasion of privacy action.
170 See e.g. the Commercial Privacy Act of Rights Act of 2011, S.
799, 112th Cong. (2011), for the creation of baseline fair infor-
mation practice protections for consumers, available at: http://
www.kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Commercial%20Privacy%
20Act%20of%20Rights%20Text.pdf. See also, Molly Jennings,
Recent Development: To Track or Not To Track: Recent Legislative Pro-
posals to Protect Consumer Privacy, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 193 (2012),
favouring this approach over the Do Not Track proposals.
171 See Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”:
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral
Advertising, 13 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 281 (2012), providing a
description of main tracking technologies and their levels of
transparency and user control. These include cookies, browser
fingerprinting and device identifiers. Ibid. at 288-300.
172 See Matecki at Note 133, 390-397 for an analysis of Facebook’s
privacy practices and disputes.
173 See Before the Federal Communications Commission, Wash-
ington D.C. 20554, In the Matter of Google Inc. (Federal Communi-
cations Commission DA 12-592, 13 April 2012), available at: http://
www.fcc.gov/document/enforcement-bureau-issues-25000-nal-
google-inc. The inquiry led to a mere fine of US$25,000 for
obstructing investigations, which also highlight the need for
adequate sanction powers for non-cooperation in investigations.
Google also faced investigations in other jurisdictions, particu-
larly in Europe.
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consumers greater control over their personal data such as in
the online behavioural advertising context.
The World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”), an Internet
standard setting organisation, is also developing a universal
web protocol for Do Not Track.174 Thus far, the implementa-
tion of DNT tools has been conducted on a voluntary basis.175
For the same reason behind promoting mandatory data pro-
tection laws over voluntary codes and guidelines, lawmakers
should take the next step and put in place mandatory re-
quirements for the creation and implementation of DNT tools
and baseline standards. In fact, attempts have already been
made to do just that in the US.176 A “universal, one-stop choice
mechanism” for online tracking will also work effectively in
the sameway as the DNC Registry. Commonmechanisms and
standards as well as sanctions will strengthen the regime.177
A DNT mechanism, like the DNC regime, will allow con-
sumers to “opt-out” entirely from online tracking while
permitting specific “opt-ins”.178 Such information can include
personal data collected or collated to create a profile on a
person’s online footprints that shows his or her interests,
behaviour, habits and physical location. Hence, the two re-
gimes supplement and complement each other.
For a template of how this DNT mechanism can operate,
reference can be made to the US Do-Not-Track Online Act of
2011,179 and the Do Not Track Me Online Act.180 The latter Act
provide for an opt-out policy to protect the user’s private in-
formation from collection by a “covered entity” (generally
private commercial enterprises)181. The “covered informa-
tion” is defined as information transmitted online such as an
individual’s online activities.182 The former Act also provides
for a browser-based opt-out mechanism, but leaves it to the
FTC to define the terms “covered entity” and “covered infor-
mation”.183 The FTC is given the rule-making authority in both
Acts.184 The Act also provides for enforcement by the FTC and
state attorneys general,185 but no private right of action.186
In its 2010 Preliminary Report,187 The FTC suggested the
use of a persistent cookie-like setting on a consumer’s web
browser that can convey the privacy setting to the websites
that the browser visits, which signals the user’s preferences in
relation being tracked (such as for targeted advertisements).
The FTC also recommended enforcement mechanisms.188
This browser-based mechanism obviates the need for a
DNC-like Registry.189 This is one alternative that can be
considered in its operation.
174 See W3C Mission, http://www.w3.org/Consortium/mission.
html.
175 E.g. browser vendors have developed tools for consumers to
indicate that they do not want to be tracked. The Digital Adver-
tising Alliance (“DAA”) for one has developed its own icon-based
tool for that purpose. See the FTC Report at v.
176 See Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Congress
(2011); Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Congress
(2011). For children in particular, attempts have also been made
to amend COPPA to establish such protections for children and
teenagers in 2011. See Do Not Track Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895,
112th Congress (2011). The Act would prohibit the collection and
use of minors’ information for targeted marketing and require
websites to permit the deletion of publicly available information
of minors.
177 See the FTC Report at c (pp.52-55). An effective “Do Not Track
system should include five key principles. First, a Do Not Track
system should be implemented universally to cover all parties that
would track consumers. Second, the choice mechanism should be
easy to find, easy to understand, and easy to use. Third, any choices
offered should be persistent and should not be overridden if, for
example, consumers clear their cookies or update their browsers.
Fourth, a DoNot Track system should be comprehensive, effective,
and enforceable. It should opt out consumers of behavioral
tracking through any means and not permit technical loopholes.
Finally, an effective Do Not Track system should go beyond simply
opting consumers out of receiving targeted advertisements; it
should opt themout of collection of behavioral data for all purposes
other than those that would be consistent with the context of the
interaction (e.g., preventing click-fraud or collecting de-identified
data for analytics purposes).” Ibid. at p.53.
178 A good suggestion was made for industry groups to organise
sector-specific opt-in registers “for individuals to indicate explicit
consent to receivemessages frommembers of the industry groups.”
Thatwas in relation to theDNCregime. SeeCP3para. 2.150.A similar
regime can also be proposed for the DNT regime to promote con-
sumer consent to being tracked. Theempowermentof the individual
to decide the type of information sent to, andcollectedon, himorher
will promote trust and confidence in the industries concerned.
179 S. 913, 112th Congress (2011).
180 H.R. 654, 112th Congress (2011).
181 H.R. 654 x2(2).
182 H.R. 654 x2(3)(A). These activities include websites, content,
date, time, geo-location of the accessing device and device type as
well as any unique identifier, such as a customer name, phone
number, IP/postal/e-mail address and financial account numbers,
etc.
183 S. 913 x 2(a)(1)-(2).
184 H.R. 654 xx3-4; S. 913 x3.
185 H.R. 654 x5.
186 Stephanie A. Kulhmann, Do Not Track Me Online: The Logistical
Struggles Over the Right “To Be Let Alone” Online, 22 DePaul J. Art
Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 229 (2011). However, the author highlights
some problems and weaknesses in the proposed Acts that require
improvements such as the greater need for a universal protection
and enforcement (i.e. a general PDP Act and a dedicated agency
like the PPDPC), exceptions from coverage as well as the lack of a
private right of action. Ibid. at 256-269. However, there will be
potential technical problems that will have to be overcome as
well as benefits of tracking that should be accommodated, such
as effective targeted advertising and customization of Internet
content. Ibid. at 269-282. Because of all these considerations and
problems, perhaps an interim step can be to provide guidelines
and recommendations or rules and regulations for baseline re-
quirements for browser-based opt-out tools (on top of user-
friendly and clear default privacy settings). Those jurisdictions
with an existing privacy authority, such as a PPDPC or Privacy
Commission, can delegate this task to that agency; which can
study existing practices and engage stakeholders in developing a
well-balanced and consistent solution in the form of Do Not
Track technologies and practices.
187 Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed
Framework for Businesses and Policymakers (Preliminary FTC Staff
Report, December 2010), available at: http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/
12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
188 Ibid. at 66.
189 Ibid. at 67. However, it was also noted that reliance on this
mechanism may have unintended consequences. An example is
given of users clearing their cookie folders unknowingly. Also, the
lack of a registry for opting-out will place a greater burden on
users to review privacy policies and to find the opt-out tools. It
was also highlighted in the report that a good DNT mechanism
must inform users on how to exercise their opt-out right as well
as what they are opting-out of.
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The US is not an isolated case. There are also recommen-
dations to update the European Union’s (“EU”) data protection
regime to incorporate a DNTmechanism,190 to be operated via
a uniform browser technology, which was suggested mainly
to meet concerns over behavioural advertising. There have
been several proposals on approaches, such as a system to
address privacy concerns in its design (“Privacy by Design”)
and the use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (“PET”) to
“[translate] ‘soft’ legal standards into ‘hard’ system specifi-
cations.”191 Yet others have suggested a combination of these
technologies.
Certainly, these templates may not be entirely relevant in
the context of other jurisdictions, but they do provide some
basis for further study and research to develop an effective
working model for any country that wants to include this
regime independently from, or supplementary to, the DNC
regime.
However, there is still a case to be made for a DNT Registry
operated by the same PPDPC as the best non-technical solu-
tion, perhaps supplemented by one or more of the above
mechanisms and approaches. The best approach or combi-
nation of approaches will have to be carefully determined,
taking into consideration the above suggestions emerging
from the US and EU as well as any other proposals.
It is to be noted that unlike the DNC regime, which is a
protective measure against unwanted direct marketing, the
DNT regime consists of measures against both indirect mar-
keting (including the use of “http cookies”) as well as geo-
location tools. In relation to the latter, the DNT regime could
also be used to re-establish consumer control over their
location information, especially for applications or platforms
where third parties are allowed to “tag” and locate others. The
consent of the person “tagged” must be obtained and refusal
should also be permitted at any point in time when that per-
son changes his or her mind.
Meanwhile, the US National DNC List,192 which is admin-
istered by the Federal Communications Commission,193 has
been a success, which can provide the impetus for follow-up
measures like a DNT mechanism. The common reason for
these registries or lists is the close relationship between
personal data protection and the protection from privacy in-
vasion, such as through the use of contact information or
tracking technologies fordirector indirect ‘pushmessaging’.194
4. Conclusion
The PDPA provides rules for personal data protection while
taking into consideration practical business and public policy
interests. The cumulative effect of the general data protection
provisions, the DNC Registry for contact information and the
enforcement mechanisms (especially the establishment of
the PPDPC) will ensure that a relatively strong and robust
regime is established. It only remains for the government to
fine tune and supplement the general provisions to ensure
that the PCPA remains relevant and effective. However, the
Act is a generally a promising one and it should not fail
spectacularly in meeting its obligations (unlike the SCA).
Meanwhile, even the jurisdictions that have matured pri-
vacy and data protection regimes are updating their laws,195
and strengthening their implementation. On 25 January
2012, the EC proposed amajor and comprehensive overhaul of
the EU legal framework on the protection of personal data to
further strengthen individual rights, especially in the face of
challenges to those rights from globalisation and new tech-
nologies.196 A major change in its reform is the proposal to
turn the PDP regime from a Directive to a Regulation,197 which
will strengthen implementation and greater ensure harmo-
nisation and consistency.198,199 Meanwhile, the US is
190 Matthew S. Kirsch, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU’s Data Protec-
tion Framework to Require Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Adver-
tising, 18 Rich. J.L. Tech. 2 (2011), available at: http://jolt.richmond.
edu/v18i1/article2.pdf, preferring the implementation of techno-
logical Do Not Track mechanism over self-regulation.
191 Jane K. Winn, Technical Standards as Data Protection Regulation,
in Reinventing Data Protection? 191, 199 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds.,
2009), quoting KPMG et al., Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Re-
lations, The Neth., Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: White Paper for
Decision-Makers 51 (December 2004), available at: http://citeseerx.
ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi¼10.1.1.101.
7649&rep¼rep1&type¼pdf.
192 See the National Do Not Call Registry website at: https://www.
donotcall.gov/. The registry operates online where registration
can be made and complaints can be filed. However, it only lacks a
function for greater inter-user and consumer cooperation and
involvement. For up-to-date information on the List, see also the
FCC Encyclopedia website at: http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/
do not call-list.
193 See the FCC Do Not Call List website at: http://www.fcc.gov/
encyclopedia/do not call-list.
194 Similarly, this relationship accounts for the proposal to extend
protection beyond contact related to a telephone address/number
(i.e. extending protection to other communications platforms).
195 E.g. amendments have been made to the Hong Kong Privacy
Ordinance to provide for higher monetary penalties for privacy
violations. Also, as technology changes, new issues and chal-
lenges will arise. For example, data control and portability for
cloud computing such as Google Drive and Dropbox services.
196 See the Europa website at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/index_en.htm. The EC identified portability (cloud
computing) and social networking portals as some of the chal-
lenges to privacy rights. The proposal is to have a DPR to address
the general privacy issues (and supersede the 16 year old Direc-
tive 95/46/EC), and a Directive to address the special issues
associated with criminal investigations.
197 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data (General Data Protection Regulation), available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_
2012_11_en.pdf.
198 A Directive requires individual EU Member States to transpose
its requirements into national law in order to implement it. A
Regulation applies throughout the EU without requiring that step.
The former is more fractious while the latter has a greater
harmonizing effect on the laws in EU Member States on the
subject matter in question.
199 The Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of in-
dividuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(ETS No. 108) (available at: http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-
manpower/passes-visas/s-pass/before-you-apply/Pages/default.
aspx) is also in the process of being modernised to take into
consideration technological advances since it opened for signa-
ture three decades ago on 28 January 1981.
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increasingly faced with the tensions of rapid development of
online business and social networking models and has been
addressing these at various levels of its administration.200
Looking further ahead, there are also some further de-
velopments that this author would like to see incorporated
in the personal data protection regime in Singapore (and
other jurisdictions offering the same level and type of pro-
tection) in the future.201 In summary, they include the
following: The enhancement of privacy protection for
vulnerable groups; the prohibition of the trade and sale of
personal data; the incorporation of the “Right To Be
Forgotten” principle into the functionality of the Act; the
extension of the DNC regime to e-mails and other non-
telephone address linked accounts for communication and
the incorporation of a DNT regime to complement the
former.
Warren B. Chik (Warrenchik@smu.edu.sg) is an Associate Pro-
fessor of Law at the School of Law, Singapore Management Uni-
versity, Singapore.
200 Although it is still confined to a non-comprehensive frame-
work, with reports and papers issued by the FTC and the White
House in 2012.
201 Singapore can take the lead as it is a small country and
enforcement is easier. The recommendations in Part 3 should be
studied for the possible future inclusion into the regime. The
Singapore PDPA and the suggested future strengthening of pro-
tection in the areas highlighted will hopefully be useful to other
jurisdictions seeking to learn from established experiences and
trends.
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